Information Age Technology, Industrial Age Laws by Winston, Elizabeth I.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
2019 
Information Age Technology, Industrial Age Laws 
Elizabeth I. Winston 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elizabeth I. Winston, Information Age Technology, Industrial Age Laws, 86 Tenn. L. Rev. _ (2019). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY, INDUSTRIAL AGE LAWS 
Elizabeth Winston* 
The United States patent system was born during the Industrial 
Age — at a time where the focus was on promoting innovation in 
machines, and tangible means of changing the world.  With the 
dawn of the Information Age, innovation is increasingly intangible.  
The industrial age laws, as currently interpreted, are not well-
suited for the changing and evolving technological world.  
Information age innovators face challenges at the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, through the judicial system and at 
the United States International Trade Commission.  It is time for a 
change in the system to reflect the realities of modern technology.  
Adequate protection is not currently provided for intangible 
innovations.  This lack of protection has wide-ranging 
implications, especially now as data processing is increasingly 
migrating to “the cloud,” geographic boundaries are eroding, and 
intangible technology is advancing in importance.  The industrial 
age laws can incentivize innovation in the information age — and 
it is time to recognize this before private ordering subsumes the 
public interest.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Technology is outpacing our patent system.  Intangible innovations are 
eroding geographic boundaries and defying categorization.  Absent 
change, those leading the evolution will leave the patent system behind, 
seeking protection through private ordering, the use of trade secrets or 
other forms of protection that do not uphold the public’s interest in 
building a storehouse of knowledge.  The industrial age laws, as currently 
interpreted, are not well-suited for the changing and evolving 
technological world.  This article is the first of its kind to analyze the 
difficulty in patenting the intangible and the issues innovators face at the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office” or “PTO”), 
through the judicial system and at the United States International Trade 
Commission.  It is time for a change in the system to reflect the realities of 
modern technology.  Adequate protection is not currently provided for 
intangible innovations.  This lack of protection has wide-ranging 
implications, especially now as data processing is increasingly migrating 
to “the cloud”, geographic boundaries are eroding, and intangible 
technology is advancing in importance.  
The United States patent system was born during the Industrial Age — at a 
time where the focus was on promoting innovation in machines, and 
tangible means of changing the world.  The patent system reflects the 
incentives to innovate in the field of tangible advances.  Much of modern 
innovation focuses on data — an intangible asset fraught with value and 
judgment.  Consider the example of orthodontia.  Traditionally, teeth were 
straightened by an orthodontist placing metal braces on a patient’s teeth — 
a tangible advance in technology.  Today, that method is still common, 
however, a system of using clear, plastic retainers to realign and correct 
patients’ teeth known as the InvisalignTM system is changing the face of 
orthodontia. Align Technology (Align), an orthodontic innovator, owns a 
number of patents related to the InvisalignTM system.1  ClearCorrect 
Operating (ClearCorrect) is a competitor, also making clear retainers that 
                                                                                                                    
1 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,070,487 (issued December 6, 2011).   
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straighten patient’s teeth without using traditional metal braces.2  Align’s 
technology requires taking an impression of the patient’s teeth, creating a 
computer model of the impression, and using a 3D printer to print a series 
of retainers that are then worn by the patient to straighten her teeth.3  The 
innovation is in the translation of the impression of the teeth to pure data 
that can be uploaded to the cloud.  That same innovation has made 
circumvention of traditional intellectual property a relatively 
straightforward enterprise for Align’s competitors.  ClearCorrect, for 
instance, takes an impression of the patient’s teeth, uploads the impression 
to the internet, uses ClearCorrect Pakistan, a Pakistani company, to create 
a computer model of the impression in Pakistan, downloads the computer 
model and prints the retainers in the United States.4  The patient is 
unaware of where each step in the patented method took place.5  The 
intangible nature of the data used in performing this method of 
straightening the teeth permits a seamless use of the method across 
geographic and across patent boundaries.  Align has faced difficulties in 
protecting their valuable intellectual property rights,6 finding itself 
defending itself before the Patent Office,7 in the judicial system8 and 
                                                                                                                    
2 See, e.g., ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. International Trade Commission, 810 F.3d. 
1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).   
3 Id.   
4 In the on-going Invisalign litigation, the accused products are digital models, digital 
data and treatment plans. The treatment plans are virtual three-dimensional models of the 
desired position of patients’ teeth at various stages of orthodontic treatment.  The models 
are initially created based on impressions of patients’ teeth, and that occurs in the United 
States.  The impressions are uploaded to a server, and downloaded in Pakistan, where the 
models are manipulated to create a treatment plan. The digital models, digital data, and 
treatment plans are electronically transmitted by uploading them to a server for use in the 
United States.  The digital models are then used in the United States to print 3-D physical 
models of a patient’s teeth.  The aligners are then formed over the physical models of the 
patient’s teeth.  Id.  
5 The important thing to note here is that some steps occur in the United States and some 
steps occur in Pakistan, and that the tangible 3-D printed clear retainers themselves do 
not violate the method claim of the patent.  Id. 
6 In 2018, Align Technology had over $2 billion in revenue.  Align Technology 
Announces Record 2018 Financial Results, ALIGN, http://investor.aligntech.com/news-
releases/news-release-details/align-technology-announces-record-2018-financial-results 
(Jan. 29, 2019).   
7 Alana Seiders, U.S. Patent Office Sides with ClearCorrect to Reexamine Invisalign 
Patent Portfolio, CLEARLY…THE CLEARCORRECT BLOG, 
http://blog.clearcorrect.com/post/US-Patent-Office-Sides-with-ClearCorrect-to-
Reexamine-Invisalign-Patent-Portfolio.aspx (June 17, 2015).   
8 Align Tech., Inc. v. ClearCorrect, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00695, 2017 WL 3726048 (S.D. 
Tex. July 27, 2017).   
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before the United States International Trade Commission.9  This multi-
phased litigation strategy is a common, expensive, and time-consuming 
strategy.  The heart of Align’s innovative method of straightening teeth is 
the data, and it is protecting the intangible data that poses Align significant 
problems.   
All intellectual property is intangible — yet there is a material difference in 
the value the patent system holds for patents on tangible innovations and 
patents covering the intangible.  Section II of this article asks what it means 
to be intangible and analyzes the history behind patenting data, methods, 
and other intangible assets.   Next, the article addresses the fundamental 
issues with using legislation drafted before the information age to protect 
modern technology and proposes clarifying the definition of invention to 
reflect the purpose behind the patent system in section III.  The question of 
when intangible intellectual property is used within the United States, and 
therefore is subject to protection under the United States Patent Code is 
discussed in section IV.  Domestic industry is directly impacted by 
electronic transmissions and other intangible, patentable assets, and Part V 
analyzes when the United States International Trade Commission has 
jurisdiction over intangible articles.  Many of the issues addressed 
throughout this article, but not all, can be dealt with during patent 
prosecution, and Part VI discusses claim drafting in the information age.  
Finally, Part VII talks about protecting the intangible through private 
ordering, given the tremendous difficulties in otherwise protecting the 
intangible.   
The information age is here, and the problems facing information age 
innovators are multi-faceted, expensive, and are obstructing the public 
interest in building a storehouse of knowledge.   It is time to take a closer 
look at how the industrial age laws protect the intangible through clarifying 
the legislative definitions, coming to a new understanding of patent 
boundaries and arming the United States International Trade Commission 
with the tools it needs to protect domestic industry.   
                                                                                                                    
9 In re Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for Use in Making 
Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances, the Appliances Made 
Therefrom, and Methods of Making the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC Pub. 2013-
18437 (Apr. 10, 2014) (Final) [hereinafter the 833 Investigation].   
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II. INTANGIBILITY 
A. THE INTANGIBLE NATURE OF PATENTS THEMSELVES 
A patent grants the patentee the right to exclude others from making, 
selling, using, offering to sell, or importing the patented innovation.10  The 
patent gives the patentee no right to make or use the invention, and there 
is nothing in the patent grant that a patentee can hold on to — the 
protection is found in the written description and claims.  Patents are 
intangible.  Despite attributes of personal property,11 a patent is not 
something that can be touched.  In 1926, the Eighth Circuit wrote: “Good 
will is property of an intangible nature. It differs from 
such intangibles as patents, copyrights, licenses, and franchises, because, 
while in a certain sense it inheres in and is used in the business, it is not 
subject to depreciation….”12 The Uniform Commercial Code defines 
“general intangible” and expressly states that “intellectual property” is an 
example of a “general intangible” in the Official Comment.13  It is no 
wonder, then, that when an intangible patent claims intangible subject 
matter, the scope of the rights granted is unclear. 14   
B. USEFUL, CONCRETE AND TANGIBLE 
Setting forth patent-eligible subject matter, section 101 maintains textual 
neutrality, failing to differentiate between machines, manufactures, 
compositions of matter, and patents claiming methods.15  Despite the 
neutrality of this text, and, despite the Federal Circuit writing that 
                                                                                                                    
10 35 U.S.C. § 101.   
11 35 U.S.C. § 261.   
12 Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 1926).   
13 See UCC § 9-102 cmt. 5(d).   
14 To take it a step further, in 2006, a patent application was filed claiming a method of 
purchasing and leasing back intangible property, such as intellectual property.  Titled 
Intangible intellectual property covering a method of profiting from intangible property 
this is an example of an intangible asset (the patent application) claiming an intangible 
innovation (a method) in the field of intangible assets (particularly intellectual property). 
U.S. Patent Application No. US11/381,682, USPTO Pub. US2007/0260549A1 (Nov. 8, 
2007).   
15 35 U.S.C. § 101; Professor Holbrook addressed this issue in his 2016 article, pointing 
out that, with one rarely used exception, sections 101, 102 and 103 of the Patent Act of 
1952 and the America Invents Act, which are the bulwark of all domestic patent 
protection are textually neutral with respect to the type of invention.   Under the Patent 
Act of 1952, there was a statutory provision differentiating between processes in the 
biotechnological arts and other methods.  The America Invents Act eliminated this 
provision.  See Timothy Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 
1001, 1008 n.27 (2017).   
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“[w]hether stated implicitly or explicitly, we consider the scope of § 101 
to be the same regardless of the form — machine or process — in which a 
particular claim is drafted,”16 distinctions continue to be drawn between 
the tangible and the intangible.  
The history of such distinctions has deep roots in the United States patent 
system.  Over thirty years ago, on January 29, 1988, Kuriappan P. 
Alappat, Edward E. Averill, and James G. Larsen (collectively Alappat) 
applied for a patent claiming a “means for creating a smooth waveform 
display in a digital oscilloscope.”17  The Patent Office rejected the patent 
application as drawn to non-statutory subject matter, i.e., a mathematical 
formula.18  Alappat appealed to the Federal Circuit where Judge Rich 
wrote that “certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, 
represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of 
practical application, and thus that subject matter is not, in and of itself, 
entitled to patent protection.”19  Judge Rich went on to find that Alappat’s 
invention, however, was not a “disembodied mathematical concept which 
may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to 
produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”20  The Federal Circuit 
embraced this new subject-matter specific test for patentability in 1998, 
holding that business method claims were patent-eligible subject matter if 
the claims produce “a useful, concrete and tangible result.”21  In 1999, the 
Federal Circuit re-emphasized this rule, finding that a “non-abstract” 
process claimed patent-eligible subject matter because it “applie[d] the 
Boolean principle to produce a useful, concrete, tangible result….”22   
Subsequently, the Patent Office issued Interim Guidelines for 
Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility.23  
The Interim Guidelines informed the examiners that subject matter could 
be found patent eligible “if the claimed invention physically transforms an 
article or physical object to a different state or thing, or if the claimed 
                                                                                                                    
16 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
1999), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(en banc).   
17 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943.    
18 Id. at 1539.     
19 Id. at 1543. 
20 Id. at 1544.   
21 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368, 47 
USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998).   
22 AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d 1352.   
23Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter 
Eligibility 2, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/news/og/2005/week47/patgupa.htm, (Nov. 22, 2005). 
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invention otherwise produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result.” 24  
Nowhere in the Interim Guidelines is the word intangible found.25  The 
Interim Guidelines expressly and incorrectly stated that: “the opposite 
meaning of ‘tangible’ is ‘abstract.’” 26   
It was not until 2010 that the Supreme Court drew a distinction between 
intangible and abstract. 27   Writing that Industrial Age processes 
(“inventions grounded in a physical or other tangible form”) are of a 
different patentable nature than Information Age processes (“software, 
advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear 
programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital signals”) 
the Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty in applying the same 
industrial age patent laws to both.28  Industrial Age processes typically 
have tangible components and, by association, are tangible.29  Information 
Age processes lack tangible components, and therefore, in their 
intangibility, are more likely to claim nothing more than abstract ideas and 
therefore less likely to be drawn to patentable subject matter. 30  Importing 
a tangibility requirement into the patent-eligibility question, the Supreme 
Court essentially held that if the intangible has a tangible component, it 
should be treated as tangible — not intangible — even though it is an 
intangible process.31  A process may be patent eligible if  “1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article 
into a different state or thing.”32  However, recognizing the distinction 
between Information Age technologies and Industrial Age technologies, 
the Supreme Court went on to say that “[t]he machine-or-transformation 
test may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating processes similar to 
those in the Industrial Age — for example, inventions grounded in a 
physical or other tangible form”33 but “there are reasons to doubt whether 
the test should be the sole criterion for determining the patentability of 
inventions in the Information Age.” 34  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held 
that the machine-or-transformation test was a useful way of determining 
                                                                                                                    
24 Id 
25 Id 
26 Id. 
27 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010).   
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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patent eligibility — but that an innovation that failed the machine-or-
transformation test could still be patent eligible.35   
Patenting the intangible continued to be an issue in litigation, and in 2014, 
writing on the patentability of software, without using the word software 
once, Justice Thomas wrote that the method claims at issue “which merely 
require generic computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract 
idea into a patent-eligible invention.”36  The patentee argued that the 
claims were tangible — as they recited the use of a computer — which 
“necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, 
realm.”37  The Supreme Court found that the fact that the claims recite a 
tangible element — a generic computer — was not enough to render the 
claims patent eligible. 38  Justice Thomas, in extrapolating what might 
otherwise be patentable, highlighted the lack of tangibility, stating that 
“[t]he method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the 
functioning of the computer itself….  Nor do they effect an improvement 
in any other technology or technical field.”39  The Supreme Court then set 
forth a two-part test which first asks if the claim is directed to a patent-
ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea, and if it, then asks if there is 
some other aspect to the claim that transforms the claim into a patent 
eligible application — and merely reciting a tangible element is not 
enough to transform the claim.40   The decision in Alice emphasizes the 
difficulty of patenting information age inventions using an industrial age 
patent system.41  
Just a few months later, the Federal Circuit evaluated the patent-eligibility 
of a method directed to collecting fees from consumers who viewed 
Internet advertisements.42  Judge Lourie wrote that the claimed method 
“recites an abstraction — an idea, having no particular concrete or 
tangible form.”43  In his concurrence, Judge Mayer reiterated this 
definition, stating that “the addition of merely novel or non-routine 
components to the claimed idea [does not] necessarily turn[] an 
abstraction into something concrete” and that an abstract idea “can escape 
                                                                                                                    
35 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at 605.   
36 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014).   
37 Id. at 224.   
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 225. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).   
43 Id.   
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the realm of the abstract only through concrete application.”44  Taking it a 
step further, Judge Mayer wrote that “[t]his concrete application is new 
technology — taking a scientific principle or natural law and ‘tying it 
down’ by implementing it in a precisely defined manner.” 45  The Federal 
Circuit held that the abstract idea at issue was not patent eligible, despite 
reciting a general-purpose computer, as no claim was made to a particular 
machine nor was a tangible transformation performed.46    
The intangible remains difficult to patent absent a concrete or tangible 
element.  One judge wrote that “[n]either the U.S. Supreme Court nor the 
Federal Circuit has set forth a bright-line test separating abstract ideas 
from concepts that are sufficiently concrete.”47  The Federal Circuit wrote 
that “precision has been elusive in defining an all-purpose boundary 
between the abstract and the concrete” in finding patent ineligible a 
method of retaining information when users navigate forms on the 
internet.48  The claims failed to recite the mechanism used to retain the 
information — in other words, the tangibility of the claim was in question 
and eligibility was not found.49  Overcoming the absence of a tangible or 
concrete element has proven very difficult, and even with the presence of 
elements that are concrete and tangible, such as a general-purpose 
computer,50 scanner,51 or interface,52 many claims are unable to overcome 
the barrier to patentability presented by the presence of an abstract idea.  
The Federal Circuit found an intangible method of recording and 
archiving digital images unpatentable, writing: “The specification does not 
describe a new telephone, a new server, or a new physical combination of 
the two….  [T]he claims are not directed to a solution to a ‘technological 
problem’ [but, instead, are] simply directed to the abstract idea of 
classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner.”53  The 
claims at issue recited tangible elements, such as a telephone, but the 
                                                                                                                    
44 Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 722.   
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Procter & Gamble Co. v. QuantifiCare Inc., 288 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 
2017).   
48 Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
49 Id. 
50 Alice, 573 U.S. 208.   
51 Content Extraction & Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l. Ass’n., 776 F.3d 
1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
52 Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Serv. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 
2016).   
53 In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016).   
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telephone was held to be merely the conduit for the abstract idea.54  
Distinguishing between the terms tangible and abstract, the Federal Circuit 
found a method abstract due to the lack of any “particular concrete or 
tangible form or application.”55  However, if concrete and tangible do not 
mean the same thing — then what exactly is the opposite of tangible?  A 
claim “that recites concrete, tangible components” can still be abstract.56  
Abstract is not a synonym for intangible.    
Again addressing the patent-eligibility of intangible processes, the Federal 
Circuit recently found that a process having a “concrete assignment of 
specified functions,” was patent eligible.57 In their decision, the Federal 
Circuit referred to an earlier decision in which the patent-eligible software 
yielded “a tangible technological benefit.”58  Each of these processes 
transformed the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible medium.59  
However, of course, a method claim that recites a concrete and tangible 
component may still not be transformed into patent-eligible subject matter 
— but it certainly helps.60  Our judicial system, despite the neutrality of 
the Patent Act, remains determined to differentiate between the tangible 
and the intangible, continuing to emphasize the importance of Industrial 
Age technology in the Information Age.   
C. A PATENT SYSTEM CEMENTED IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 
“An idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be 
made practically useful is.”61  The Supreme Court thus differentiated in 
1874 between the tangible implementation, which the Court held obvious, 
and the intangible idea, which the Court found not to be patent eligible.62  
This decision fit in with the actuality that most patents granted in the 
Industrial Age tended to include the tangible, as acknowledged by Justice 
                                                                                                                    
54 Id.   
55 Versata Dev. Group v. SAP America, Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
56 Id. 
57 Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. HTC America, Inc., 908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018), as 
amended, (Nov. 20, 2018).  
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60 See, e.g., TLI, 823 F.3d at 611 (“However, not every claim that recites concrete, 
tangible components escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry.”); Alice, 573 U.S. at 
212 (“We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated 
settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform 
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).   
61 Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507, 22 L. Ed. 410 (1874).   
62 Id. 
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Kennedy, even when claiming intangible methods.63  Applying the Patent 
Act of 1836, where the word “art” was used to refer to what is now called 
a “process” the Supreme Court wrote that it was “not easy to give a 
precise definition of what is meant by the term ‘art,’ as used in the acts of 
Congress.”64  Art was then held to apply “to all those cases where the 
application of a principle is the most important part of the invention, and 
where the machinery, apparatus, or other means, by which the principle is 
applied, are incidental only and not of the essence of his invention.”65  The 
application of a principle, of course, imagines that the art will have a 
tangible element to it.  This tangibility requirement arose again in a later 
opinion holding that “a process is a mode of treatment of certain materials 
to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon 
the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or 
thing.”66  In 1890, the leading patent treatise of the era wrote that “An art 
or operation is an act or a series of acts performed by some physical 
agent upon some physical object, and producing in such object some 
change either of character or of condition. It is also called a ‘process.’”67   
Thomas Jefferson, the first United States Commissioner for Patents, 
believed that patent-eligible subject matter should be limited “to particular 
machines, not to all possible applications or uses of them.”68  This long 
history tying tangible outcomes to the patentability of intangible processes 
has proven difficult to overcome in the Information Age.69  Judge Dyk 
goes into a detailed history of the definition of “process” as used in 35 
U.S.C. § 101 in his dissent from In re Bilski concluding that: 
There is no suggestion in any of this early consideration of process 
patents that processes for organizing human activity were or ever 
had been patentable. Rather, the uniform assumption was that the 
only processes that were patentable were processes for using or 
creating manufactures, machines, and compositions of matter.70 
Firmly cementing itself in the Industrial Age patent system, the Supreme 
Court subsequently wrote: 
                                                                                                                    
63 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at 605.   
64 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 130, 14 L. Ed. 601 (1853).   
65 Id. 
66 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L. Ed. 139 (1876) 
67 1 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents For Useful Inventions § 159 (1890).   
68 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man 284 (1951).   
69 See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman dissenting) (“The 
… patent system is directed to tangible things and procedures, not mere ideas.”).   
70 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 972 (Dyk, J., concurring).   
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[The Information] Age puts the possibility of innovation in the 
hands of more people and raises new difficulties for the patent law. 
With ever more people trying to innovate and thus 
seeking patent protections for their inventions, the patent law faces 
a great challenge in striking the balance between protecting 
inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others 
would discover by independent, creative application of general 
principles.71  
Despite this historical emphasis on how processes contain tangible 
elements, these opinions do not limit what processes are patent eligible — 
only point out how broadly processes can be claimed — and emphasize 
that the difficulty in understanding what a process is might be allayed 
when the process is tied to a tangible element.72  The very neutrality of the 
language of section 101 makes it clear that ideas can be patented — not in 
and of themselves — but a process is an idea — and its patent-eligibility 
should be determined absent an evaluation of its tangible elements.   
D. INFORMATION AGE INTANGIBILITY 
Patent infringement has changed as technology has advanced.  In the 
industrial age of technology, innovations were tangible and present — 
often in the same room as the infringer.  The means of controlling access 
to the technology might have been as simple as isolating the room where 
the technology is located73 or placing the technology under lock and key.74  
Today, the technology may be in another country, rendering technology 
that much more difficult to protect and infringement more challenging to 
define.  Even something as simple as reading a book has changed 
dramatically.75  The industrial age patent system is designed to protect the 
                                                                                                                    
71 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at 605.   
72 In re Prater, 56 C.C.P.A. 1381, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 (1969).  
73 See, e.g., Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. H. Griffin & Sons Co., 29 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1928) 
(The technology at issue was partitioned off from the rest of the factory, isolated, and 
“[a]ccess … was possible only by crossing a bridge between two buildings.”).   
74 JAMES D. NORRIS, R.G. DUN & CO., 1841-1900: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT-
REPORTING IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 53-54 (1978)(In order to access the Dun & 
Bradstreet Reports, purchasers in 1859 had to agree to keep the reports “on the 
designated premises of the firm, in a secure place … and to keep the information 
confidential.  [The volumes were further] equipped with lock and key.”). 
75  See, e.g., Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 553, 556–57 (D. 
Del. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 626 F. App’x. 
1010 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The patents are directed to systems, devices, and methods for 
enabling the transmission and storage of document references or ‘tokens,’ each of which 
is associated with an electronic document stored in a database. This enables mobile users 
to access all of their electronic documents without being limited by the memory available 
 
2019] TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [14 	
tangible e-reader — but the current implementation of the system does not 
adequately protect the intangible advances that allow the e-reader to store 
documents on a central server.76  The next wave of innovation is 
intangible, and it is time for the patent system to recognize and embrace 
the patentability of the intangible.   
E. INTANGIBLE DOES NOT MEAN ABSTRACT 
Abstract ideas are not patent-eligible subject matter.77  Intangible 
innovations are not necessarily abstract — and so should not be painted 
with the broad brush of patent ineligibility.  There is no simple test for 
determining what abstract subject matter is78 — in the same way that there 
is no simple test for determining how broad or narrow a claim is.79  Not 
everything intangible is abstract, and not everything abstract is intangible.  
A method or a process is intangible — yet, James Diehr was awarded a 
patent for a “method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision 
molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer.”80  James Diehr’s 
                                                                                                                    
on a mobile device. The electronic document references, which identify electronic 
documents stored in a database, can be passed back and forth between the central 
database and the portable device, or between the portable device and other devices.  A 
device can use the electronic document reference to request delivery of the full electronic 
document from the database.”).   
76  Id.   
77 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This Court has undoubtedly recognized 
limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded 
from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”).  
In fact, Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have said that, out of the judicially-
created exceptions, “the most significant remaining exception is the rule against the 
patenting of abstract ideas.”  Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent 
Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1642 (2003).   
78 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (“we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of 
the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”).  
79 See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853), where the USPTO issued a 
claim to Morse reading: 
“I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery 
described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention 
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I 
call electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible 
characters, signs or letters at any distances, being a new application of that 
power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.” 
The Supreme Court determined that the claim was too broad and therefore not a valid 
claim stating that to grant legal force to an overly broad claim is to allow the patentee to 
prevent “others from attempting to improve upon the manner and process which he has 
described in his specification — and may deter the public  from using, it, even if 
discovered.”    
80 U.S. Patent No. 4,344,142 (issued Aug. 10, 1982).   
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patent was directed towards a way of performing a series of steps — 
hardly something one can hold in one’s hand.  However, this method, 
directed as it is, to the tangible art of curing and molding rubber (creating 
something that can be held), was found by the Supreme Court not to be 
abstract.  As the Supreme Court stated: “In contrast, the respondents here 
do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent 
protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber.”81  A mathematical 
formula is intangible, as is a process for curing rubber, but only one is 
abstract.82  A patent for a method of preparing steel for painting was held 
patentable over the argument that it was an unpatentable principle.83   
Holding that “[t]he invention consists in the subjection of a specific object 
to the influence of a specific force through a specific mode of application” 
the Delaware District Court found that this was “a true process or art, as 
distinguished from a principle or effect, and as such is within the scope of 
the patent act, and consequently is patentable subject-matter.”84  Again, 
relying on the tangible outcome of the process, the court found the 
intangible method patentable.   
This lack of delineation between the abstract and the intangible is firmly 
entrenched in United States Patent Law.  All claims are abstract to a 
certain extent — and yet the vast majority of claims are claiming the 
tangible.85  In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Gottschalk v. Benson, 
which raised the question of whether a “method for converting binary-
coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals” was patent-
eligible subject matter.86  Benson’s intangible claim to an abstract idea 
was held not to claim patent-eligible subject matter. 87 The main concern 
of the Supreme Court was the nature of the claim that was “so abstract and 
sweeping” as to fully pre-empt any other use of the algorithm in question. 
88  The Supreme Court highlighted the lack of a tangible nature to the 
claim — writing that the claim in question could be performed without a 
computer and was, at its very essence, an abstract algorithm.  In briefly 
laying out the history of patent-eligible intangible processes, Justice 
Douglas highlighted the tangible aspects of that history.  Justice Douglas 
                                                                                                                    
81 Diehr at 187.   
82 Id. (“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.”)   
83 Am. Chem. Paint Co. v. C.R. Wilson Body Co., 298 F. 310, 311 (D. Del. 1924).   
84 Id.   
85 See Alan L. Durham, The Paradox of “Abstract Ideas,” 2011 Utah L. Rev. 797, 843 
(2011).  
86 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).   
87 Id.   
88 Id.   
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stated that precedent demonstrated that a process claim could qualify as 
patent eligible, if it was “tied to a particular machine or apparatus or 
operate[d] to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’”  
However, the Supreme Court went on to state that it did not intend to 
“freeze process patents to old technologies, leaving no room for the 
revelations of the new, onrushing technology,” but acknowledged that if 
software was to be patentable, then “considerable problems are raised” 
and suggested that “considered action by the Congress is needed.” 89   
A few years later, the Supreme Court was again faced with the question of 
how to patent the intangible.  In Parker v. Flook, the question was the 
patentability of a mathematical algorithm used during the catalytic 
chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.90  Tied to the field of hydrocarbons, 
Flook’s invention was neither as abstract nor as sweeping as Benson’s 
claim.91  The Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he line between a patentable 
‘process’ and an unpatentable “principle” is not always clear,” but that any 
“notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious 
in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process 
exalts form over substance.” 92  In other words, the abstract can remain 
abstract, even if it claims a tangible element.  Flook may have sought to 
limit the scope of his idea, but it remained unpatentable.93  Finally, the 
Supreme Court wrote 
Neither the dearth of precedent, nor this decision, should therefore 
be interpreted as reflecting a judgment that patent protection of 
certain novel and useful computer programs will not promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts, or that such protection is 
undesirable as a matter of policy. 94 
Diehr, Benson, and Flook continue to find support in the modern Supreme 
Court and at the Patent Office.  In January 2019, the PTO announced that 
all examiners reviewing claims that recite judicial exceptions must 
evaluate “whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the 
identified judicial exception into a practical application.”95  The “practical 
                                                                                                                    
89 Id.   
90 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).   
91 Id.   
92 Id. 
93 Id.   
94 Id. 
95 U. S. Patent and Trademark Office Announces Revised Guidance for Determining 
Subject Matter Eligibility, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, (Jan. 4, 
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application” language comes straight from Justice Douglas’ opinion in 
Benson, where the claim was found unpatentable because “[t]he 
mathematical formula involved … has no substantial practical 
application.”96   
The test of patentability does not turn on the tangibility of the invention — 
there is no statutory requirement of tangibility.  In patenting the 
intangible, the patentee may be seeking to patent the abstract, but that is 
not a given.  Simply because the patentee is seeking to patent the 
intangible does not statutorily or judicially subject the patent to heightened 
scrutiny.  Intangibility does not “doom the claims”97 as can be seen from 
the patentability of method claims.  A method of obtaining “seismograms 
which delineate with a high degree of precision the nature of the 
subsurface formations in the earth’s crust”98 has been held patentable as 
has a method of identifying patients at risk of ventricular tachycardia by 
analyzing electrocardiographic signals.99  A method of handling 
audio/video source information was later found to be obvious but was not 
challenged for lack of subject matter eligibility.100  An intangible claim is 
not necessarily an abstract claim — and the distinction needs to made not 
on whether what is claimed is tangible or not — but on whether what is 
claimed is abstract.   
F. INTANGIBLE MANUFACTURE 
In 2007, the Federal Circuit reviewed the patent eligibility of a patent 
claiming a method of sending a signal with a digitally embedded 
watermark, a device for sending the signal, a storage medium holding the 
signal containing the watermark and the signal itself.101  The only claims 
on appeal before the Federal Circuit were those claiming the actual 
signal.102  The Patent Office rejected the claim as an abstract idea — one 
                                                                                                                    
2019), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/us-patent-and-trademark-office-
announces-revised-guidance-determining-subject. 
96 Benson, 409 at 71.   
97 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“that the 
improvement is not defined by reference to ‘physical’ components does not doom the 
claims.”).  
98 Application of Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).   
99 Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 
1992).   
100 U.S. Patent No. 5,164,839 (issued Nov. 17, 1992).   
101 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
102 Id. at 1351 (Claim 14, the only independent claim to the signal read: “A signal with 
embedded supplemental data, the signal being encoded in accordance with a given 
encoding process and selected samples of the signal representing the supplemental data, 
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with no “physical attributes”  and, also, for not fitting into any of the 
patent-eligible subject matter categories of § 101.103  The Federal Circuit 
found that the claims on appeal covered only transitory signals, and held 
that physical, but transitory, signals were not patent eligible as they are 
neither process nor product.104  In its discussion of whether a signal was a 
manufacture or not, the Federal Circuit held that a manufacture must be 
tangible in nature. 105  In finding the signal not to be patent eligible the 
Federal Circuit referred to the fleeting nature of the signal and the lack of 
any “semblance of permanence during transmission.”106  In determining 
whether a signal is patent eligible, the Federal Circuit seems to have 
turned to section 102 of the Copyright Act, rather than section 101 of the 
Patent Act.  Under the Copyright Act, only “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression” are copyright-eligible. 107  A 
work is “fixed” when its embodiment is not merely transitory. 108  The 
requirements that the signal be tangible and non-transitory are 
requirements normally associated with copyright law and not with patent 
law.  Judge Linn dissented-in-part, stating that he disagreed with limiting 
the definition of manufacture to “non-transitory, tangible things.”109  A 
few years later the Federal Circuit went on to hold that “Data in its 
ethereal, non-physical form is simply information that does not fall under 
any of the categories of eligible subject matter under § 101.”110   
Intangible products may not meet the requirements of section 101 because 
they lack utility due to an absence of function or because they do nothing 
more than embody abstract ideas.  Intangible manufactures, however, 
should have the chance to show that they are more than abstract ideas and 
have function — in other words, they should be given the same treatment 
given tangible manufactures — and first be evaluated as patent-eligible 
subject matter.  The signal in Nuijten is intangible — but it takes an input 
material, a signal, and adds a watermark, giving the signal a new form, 
new qualities, and new properties.111  There are many difficulties with 
                                                                                                                    
and at least one of the samples preceding the selected samples is different from the 
sample corresponding to the given encoding process.”).   
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id 
107 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
108 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
109 Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1358-9 (Linn, J., dissenting in part). 
110 Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014).   
111 Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1358-9 (Linn, J., dissenting in part) (citing American Fruit 
Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931).   
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protecting intangible innovations, but rendering intangible innovations 
unpatentable as a class is a far too narrow interpretation of a manufacture 
under section 101.   
III. LEGISLATING THE INTANGIBLE 
Intangible advances in technology are essential to business today.  
Protecting such advances through the industrial age patent system is 
difficult.  Numerous intangible innovations are new ways of performing 
well-known tasks, raising patent-eligibility questions outside the issue of 
subject matter — yet these questions remained focused on the intangible 
innovations.112  What is patent-eligible subject matter should be at the 
heart of the discussion — and the difficulty with answering that question is 
the focus of this section of the article.   
Methods of doing or conducting business are intangible and vital in the 
way they are shaping patent policy today.  It was not always clear that 
business methods were patent-eligible subject matter.  With the increase in 
importance of computers and software, innovators sought protection for 
their ideas.113  Copyright law was a poor fit, contracts require privity, and 
so innovators sought protection for their methods from the patent system.  
In 1998, the Federal Circuit held business methods patentable.114  
Congress followed suit, codifying the validity of business method patents 
                                                                                                                    
112 One notorious example of such innovation was the patent received by Amazon for its 
“1-Click® ordering” system.  This system allowed customers to purchase items with 1-
click and, by relying on stored information, avoid the shopping cart check out system 
typical of the internet buying experience.   Many argued at the time that the patent should 
not have been issued because it was neither novel nor non-obvious.  Regardless, Amazon 
received the patent, licensed it to others, enforced it in court and the innovation is often 
cited as one of the reasons Amazon’s business grew as large as it did.  Keith Collins, A 
Patent That Helped Amazon Take Over Online Commerce is About to Expire, QUARTZ, 
Aug. 19, 2017, https://qz.com/1057490/a-patent-that-helped-amazon-take-over-online-
commerce-is-about-to-expire/.   
113 Software developers struggled to find a way to protect their innovations.  Using 
contracts to augment intellectual property protection first gained popularity with the use 
of software licenses at a time when statutory protection for software was close to non-
existent.  See, e.g., Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Rice Decl. ¶ 6)(“[h]istorically, the purpose of ‘licensing’ 
computer program copy use was to employ contract terms to augment trade secret 
protection in order to protect against unauthorized copying at a time when, first, the 
existence of a copyright in computer programs was doubtful, and, later, when the extent 
to which copyright provided protection was uncertain.”).   
114 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998).   
 
2019] TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [20 	
in the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, stating that a “method of doing 
or conducting business” could be infringed.115   
Despite this affirmation, obtaining a patent on a business method remains 
fraught with peril.  A recent study looked at patent prosecution in the 
Patent Office’s technology center 3600BM encompassing computer-
implemented business methods — in other words, the genuinely intangible 
advances.116  The study found an allowance rate of around 36% for this 
technology center,117 compared with an overall allowance rate for patent 
applications of around 75%.118   Furthermore, the patent examiner with the 
single lowest allowance rate — 1% — is an examiner in the business 
methods art.119    
Part of the explanation for this difficulty comes from Congress’ interest in 
business method patents.  In the first decade after the Federal Circuit held 
business methods patent eligible, industry filed over 40,000 business 
method patent applications.120 When those numbers were brought to the 
attention of Congress, alarm bells rang.  Senator Kyl stated, “the 
expectation [is] that most if not all true business-method patents are 
abstract and therefore invalid.”121  Senator Schumer opined that “[C]ertain 
business method patents ... are generally of dubious quality because unlike 
other types of patents, they have not been thoroughly reviewed at the PTO 
due to a lack of the best prior art.”122  The America Invents Act (“AIA”) 
codified the Covered Business Method (“CBM”) procedures in response 
to this perceived “flood of poor quality business method patents and a 
cottage industry of business method patent litigation”123  Although the 
AIA explicitly recognized the patentability of intangible business 
                                                                                                                    
115 First Inventor Defense Act of 1999 (1999 Act), 113 Stat. 1501A–555 (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 273).   
116 Mark S. Nowotarski, Surviving Alice with Big Data, 11 Landslide 56, 57–58 (2018).   
117 Id. at 61.   
118 Chad Gilles, The Easiest and Most Difficult Patent Examiners — Allowance Rate and 
Actions Per Disposal, BIGPATENTDATA, March 29, 2019, 
https://bigpatentdata.com/2019/03/the-easiest-and-most-difficult-patent-examiners-
allowance-rate-and-actions-per-disposal/.   
119 Id.   
120 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 992. 
121 157 Cong. Rec. S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).   
122 157 Cong. Rec. S1364 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).   
123 Id.; AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).  
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methods, the CBM procedures provided another barrier to those seeking to 
protect the intangible.124    
Business methods are financial, non-technological advances — clearly 
information age, intangible innovations.  CBM procedures provide an 
additional level of scrutiny for parties who believe that a patent claiming 
“covered business methods” has been infringed.125  Once a patentee has 
charged another with infringement, then the interested party may file a 
petition with the Patent Office seeking a review of the validity of the 
patent at issue. 126  All patents are presumed valid upon issuance.  The 
covered business method patentee is not entitled to the same presumption 
of validity as those seeking to protect tangible advances in the art. 127  
CBM procedures allow a party charged with infringement to ask the 
Patent Office to review a CBM patent for validity — even once the patent 
has issued.  A party to whom a patent claiming a covered business method 
has been issued, and who wishes to protect that patent by suing an 
infringer, may find themselves having to reprove the validity of their 
issued patent, despite the presumption of validity carried by all patents.   
In acknowledging the patentability of information age technology, 
Congress discriminated between covered business methods and tangible 
advances.  
The lack of clarity in defining what aspects of information age technology 
are patent eligible is not an issue peculiar to the United States.  In Japan, 
any “highly advanced creation of technical ideas utilizing the laws of 
nature” is patent eligible.128 The Japanese Patent Act then excludes 
explicitly “any invention that is liable to injure public order, morality or 
public health” from patent eligibility.129  The European Patent Convention 
(EPC) defines patent-eligible inventions to be those “inventions, in all 
                                                                                                                    
124 35 U.S.C. § 321.  The AIA contains a sunset provision with respect to CBM 
proceedings and no new CBM petitions can be filed after September 16, 2020.      
Leahy--Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329 
(2011). 
125 AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).   
126 Id. 
127 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 
125 Stat. 284 (2011).   
128 Patent Eligible Subject Matter: Report on Views and Recommendations From the 
Public 18 (July 2017), UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101-Report_FINAL.pdf, quoting 
TOKKYO-HO [PATENT CODE] Law No. 121 of 1959, as last amended by Law No. 55 of 
2015, art. 2(1), available in English at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/jp/jp206en.pdf. 
129 Id. 
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fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step 
and are susceptible of industrial application.”130  The EPC then limits 
patent-eligible subject matter further — noting that specific categories 
including business methods, discoveries, scientific methods, and computer 
programs are not inventions, while plant and animal varieties are not 
patent-eligible subject matter.131   
Following the lead of the EPC and Japan and codifying the exceptions to 
patent eligibility for particular inventions would help inventors of 
intangible innovators understand how to protect their inventions.132  
Amending the definitions outlined in section 100 would mirror the 
approach taken by Japan and the EPC, allow the United States to codify 
the guidelines set forth for US patent examiners, and retain the language 
of section 101, first drafted in 1793 that has worked for over two hundred 
and twenty-five years.   
Currently, section 100 defines an invention as an “invention or 
discovery.”133  Amending section 100 to delineate what an invention is 
would reduce litigation costs, increase judicial efficiency, and make it 
easier for information age innovators to make decisions about how to best 
protect their innovations.  The current diminished level of clarity as to 
what is patent eligible yields unpredictable results, leaving patentees, 
potential infringers and investors uncertain as to whether a patent issued 
today will be enforceable tomorrow.134  One expert commentator wrote, 
                                                                                                                    
130 Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973 as revised by the Act 
revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC of 29 
November 2000 [hereinafter EPC Rules], Art. 52.  
131 Id.  
132 In addition to the codified exceptions, the Japanese patent examiners have a detailed 
list given to them of non-statutory inventions which are not patent eligible. These 
guidelines contain a detailed list of excluded inventions. Under these guidelines, the 
excluded categories are not a “creation of a technical idea utilizing the laws of nature” 
and are, therefore, not statutory inventions.  EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND 
UTILITY MODEL (SIC) IN JAPAN, Japan Patent Office, Examination Standards Office (Oct. 
2015), pt. III, ch. 1, § 2.1, available in English at 
https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/system/laws/rule/guideline/patent/tukujitu_kijun/document/index
/all_e.pdf.  In a similar fashion, the guidelines issued to United States patent examiners 
state that “claims directed to nothing more than abstract ideas (such as mathematical 
algorithms), natural phenomena, and laws of nature are not eligible for patent 
protection.”  United States Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (M.P.E.P) § 2106.04 (9th ed. March 2014) (latest revision Jan. 2018).   
133 35 U.S.C. § 100.   
134 See, e.g., John P. Walsh, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on 
Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. 
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (“Some firms have also begun concentrating on 
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“[i]t is simply ridiculous that after 40 years of debate, we still do not have 
an answer to the simple question of whether (or when) software is 
patentable.”135  The difficulties faced by those seeking to patent business 
methods demonstrates the lack of clarity inherent in the current patent 
system.  Codifying a definition of “invention” under section 100 would be 
of great benefit to all.  Congress should set forth a clear definition of an 
invention by amending 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) to read as follows: 
The term “invention” means invention or discovery.  The 
following are not statutory inventions or discoveries: 
(i) The laws of nature as such 
(ii) Mere discoveries and not creations, such as laws of nature, 
natural phenomena and natural things; 
(iii) Those contrary to the laws of nature  
(iv) Abstract ideas in which the laws of nature are not utilized136 
Section 101 says that to be patent eligible an invention or discovery must 
be useful, but fails to define utility.137  Utility has long been a requirement 
of the patent system, and as early as 1852 the Supreme Court stated that to 
                                                                                                                    
their most promising targets, because of the high cost of maintaining patents and the low 
value of many … patents … that may not give rights to downstream developments.”).    
135 Dennis Crouch, Ongoing Debate: Is Software Patentable?, PATENTLY-O (July 27, 
2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/07/ongoing-debate-is-software-patentable.html/.   
136 This language is based on the guidelines issued to Japanese patent examiners.  
EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND UTILITY MODEL (SIC) IN JAPAN, Japan 
Patent Office, Examination Standards Office (Oct. 2015), pt. III, ch. 1, § 2.1, available in 
English at 
https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/system/laws/rule/guideline/patent/tukujitu_kijun/document/index
/all_e.pdf; In addition, a proposed framework was set forth for a modified section 101 by 
Senators Coons and Tillis and Representatives Collins, Johnson and Stivers on April 17, 
2019.  The framework proposed defining: 
[I]n a closed list, exclusive categories of statutory subject matter which alone 
should not be eligible for patent protection. The sole list of exclusions might 
include the following categories, for example:  
Fundamental scientific principles; 
Products that exist solely and exclusively in nature; 
Pure mathematical formulas; 
Economic or commercial principles; 
Mental activities.  
Sens. Coons and Tillis and Reps. Collins, Johnson and Stivers Release Section 101 
Patent Reform Framework (April 17, 2019), https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-
releases/sens-coons-and-tillis-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-section-101-
patent-reform-framework. 
137 35 U.S.C. § 101.   
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be patent eligible an innovation must have a “practical result” and “special 
purpose.”138  Utility has never meant just that the patent must work — 
indeed, PTO guidelines state that all claimed inventions must have 
specific and substantial utility — something more than merely “the use of 
a complex invention as landfill.”139  When even the examiners struggle to 
understand what it means to be useful, deciding whether the risk of 
allowance outweighs the cost of  disclosing trade secrets is a daunting 
determination for an innovator to make.  Codifying this requirement will 
allow innovators to understand what is required to receive the grant of a 
patent.140   
Information age innovations have been challenged for claiming general-
purpose computers,141 abstract ideas,142 mental steps,143 and failing to 
claim significant post-solution transformative elements.144  The Patent 
Office itself has acknowledged that the “legal uncertainty surrounding 
Section 101 poses unique challenges for the USPTO.”145  Codifying the 
requirement that an invention has specific,146 substantial,147 and practical 
utility148 mitigates much of that uncertainty by delineating what is patent-
                                                                                                                    
138 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).   
139 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2107, UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE (9th ed. rev. Jan. 2018).   
140A proposal to revise sections 100 and 101 was released on May 22, 2019 by Sens. 
Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson and Stivers.  The first thing the proposed 
legislation does is to define what it means to be “useful.”  To be useful, an innovation 
must now provide “specific and practical utility in any field of technology through 
human intervention.” 
Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson and Stivers Release Draft Bill Text to 
Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-
stivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act.   
141 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. 208. 
142 See, e.g., Ultramercial, 772 F.3d 709.    
143 See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016).   
144 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).    
145 United States Patent and Trademark Office 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter 
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/01/07/2018-28282/2019-revised-patent-
subject-matter-eligibility-guidance.   
146 See, e.g., In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (CCPA 1967).   
147 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365(Fed. Cir. 2005).   
148 In January 2019, the USPTO released guidelines directing examiners to determine 
whether a claim that is directed to a judicial exception has “integrated the exception into 
a practical application.”  A “practical application” is further defined as one that “will 
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit 
on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to 
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eligible subject matter.   Ratifying hundreds of years of precedent, 35 
U.S.C. § 100 should be amended to include a definition of “useful” that 
reads as follows: “The term ‘useful’ means the claimed invention has 
specific, substantial and practical utility.” 
Specific utility requires proof that the benefit to the public of the patent 
disclosure exceeds the mere use of the innovation as an “object of 
scientific research.”149  The patent system is a balancing act between the 
benefit received by the public from the patent disclosure and the benefit to 
the patentee of receiving the exclusive right to prevent others from 
unauthorized use of the invention for a limited time.  Specific utility 
reaffirms the fundamental nature of this bargain.150  By codifying the 
requirement that an invention has specific utility, inventors claiming 
software implemented on a general-purpose computer may find their 
inventions rejected for lack of specific utility.  The focus shifts from 
whether the claim is an abstract idea — to the more fundamental question 
of is the claim one that benefits the public.  A general utility is one that 
applies to a broad class of inventions — and software implemented on a 
general-purpose computer may have general utility (it works) but lack 
specific utility in the absence of a disclosure of a particular computer or 
some other transformative post-solution step.  The codification of this 
language clarifies the difficulties faced by those seeking information age 
patents — but such clarity also offers insight into ways to better protect 
those innovations as well. 
The proposal detailed by this article also requires inventions to have 
practical utility.151  In re-iterating the patentability of business-method 
patents, Judge Rich wrote that the question of patentability should not turn 
on the four categories of subject matter outlined in section 101, but rather 
on “the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, 
                                                                                                                    
monopolize the judicial exception.”  United States Patent and Trademark Office 2019 
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/01/07/2018-28282/2019-revised-patent-
subject-matter-eligibility-guidance [hereinafter 2019 Guidance].   
149 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) 
150 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Specific utility requires the 
provision to the public of a “well-defined and particular benefit.”).   
151 In recognition of the many issues facing examiners of intangible information age 
innovations, in January 2019 the Patent Office issued guidance to its examiners on 
approaching eligibility issues under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Examiners were instructed to use a 
two-step method before rejecting claims for lack of subject matter eligibility.  If the claim 
specifically recites subject matter that is proscribed by the “defined categories of judicial 
exceptions” then the examiner is to determine whether the claim “integrates the recited 
exception into a practical application.”   2019 Guidance.   
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its practical utility.”152  Practical utility “is a shorthand way of attributing 
‘real-world’ value to claimed subject matter. In other words, one skilled in 
the art can use a claimed discovery in a manner that provides some 
immediate benefit to the public.”153  Setting forth a test for “practical 
utility” is considerably more difficult than asking whether an invention 
works or not.154  Codification of this requirement recognizes the already 
existing unwritten requirement.  In applying the practical utility test to 
intangible innovations, the focus shifts from the question of whether the 
claim is to a concrete advancement, to the determination of what the 
benefit to the public of the claim is.  The practical application test was 
first used in 1849 by the Northern District of New York Circuit Court in 
holding that “the person who first reduces the idea to practical application 
and use is entitled to the patent.”155  The claimed invention was a new 
application of a principle — and the practical application of the idea was 
held to be patentable.156  In 1852, the Supreme Court held that “a new 
property discovered in matter, when practically applied, in the 
construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture, is 
patentable.”157  Practical and tangible are neither synonyms nor antonyms.  
The industrial age decisions focused on timely practical and tangible 
innovations.  As the advances have shifted from the industrial age to the 
information age, the over one hundred and fifty years of case law on what 
is a practical application contains many examples of practical utility of 
intangible innovations.158   
Defining invention and utility clarifies the bargaining process.  A patent is 
a bargain whereby the public grants the inventor a limited set of rights in 
return for learning the intimate details of the invention.  With the 
constantly shifting background of patent eligibility, and the substantial 
cost of obtaining a patent — both monetary and informational costs — 
                                                                                                                    
152 State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943.   
153 Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (CCPA 1980). 
154 The earlier proposed framework stated that proposed legislation would “create a 
‘practical application’ test to ensure that the statutorily ineligible subject matter is 
construed narrowly.” Sens. Coons and Tillis and Reps. Collins, Johnson and Stivers 
Release Section 101 Patent Reform Framework (April 17, 2019), 
https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/sens-coons-and-tillis-and-reps-collins-
johnson-and-stivers-release-section-101-patent-reform-framework.   
155 Foote v. Silsby, 9 F. Cas. 373, 381 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1849), aff’d, 55 U.S. 218 (1852).   
156 Id.   
157 Tatham, 55 U.S. at 175.   
158 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (intangible method of curing and molding rubber 
articles which resulted in cured and molded rubber found patentable).   
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many information age innovators are choosing to find other ways to 
protect their ideas and removing the benefit from the public granted by the 
patent system.  Amending section 100 allows the United States to utilize 
better the industrial age laws to protect information age technology and 
upholds the patent bargain for the public and the innovators.     
IV. PROTECTING THE INTANGIBLE  
In 2007, Apple and Burst.com settled a lawsuit over infringement of 
Burst.com’s patent portfolio by Apple.  Burst.com patented a method of 
faster-than-real-time transmission of data that paved the way for 
Windows’ Media Player and Apple’s iPod.159  Burst.com’s patent 
portfolio contained patents that received data, compressed the data, and 
transmitted the data.160  The valuable technology involved in this litigation 
was data.  Downloading a movie from Netflix, a book from Overdrive or a 
song from iTunes involves transmitting compressed data.  It is without 
question that an intangible asset, a patent, protecting intangible assets, 
data, has value.  The question is — how to best protect that value and 
promote innovation through the patent system.   
A. CIRCUMNAVIGATING THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Innovation in the information age focuses on technology without 
geographic boundaries.  Industrial age technology was restricted by the 
location of the machinery and devices that made life more comfortable.  
Today, life is made easier by the very erosion of the geographic barriers 
that limit enforcement of section 271.  In order to infringe a United States 
patent, the infringer must avail themselves, without permission, of the 
patented technology within the United States.  The patent boundaries of 
the United States delineate the geographic reach of United States patent 
law.  Outside these boundaries, infringement under United States law 
cannot be found.161   Cloud computing, compartmentalization of 
technology, and the eroding connection between geography and 
                                                                                                                    
159 Katie Marsal, Apple Settles Burst.com Patent Suit for $10 Million, APPLEINSIDER 
(Nov. 21, 2007),  
https://appleinsider.com/articles/07/11/21/apple_settles_burst_com_patent_suit_for_10_
million.   
160 Id.   
161 See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 
(1915)(“The right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States 
and its territories … and infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly 
done in a foreign country.”) 
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technology reveals the flaws in the industrial age laws, as the intention 
behind the patent system is frustrated by the judicial implementation of 
the patent laws.162  It is time to ameliorate these discrepancies and to 
enforce the purpose behind the patent system.  If an invention is controlled 
from within the United States, its financial benefits accrue within the 
United States and sufficient prefatory acts exist, then the invention is 
being used within the United States and can be found to infringe United 
States patents.   
Burst.com’s patents claimed both the method of faster-than-real-time 
transmission and the means of performing the transmission.  If Apple had 
stored the compressed data outside the United States, then under the 
current interpretation of the patent laws, Apple would not have infringed 
any method claim that included the step of storing the data.163  
Burst.com’s patents would, accordingly, have been worth considerably 
less, and perhaps the research and development put into Burst.com’s 
technology would have been used for other purposes.   
Contrast this potential outcome with the outcome under British law.  Dr. 
Julian Menashe received a patent claiming a networked gaming system for 
an interactive casino game in which there were multiple computers in 
different locations. 164  William Hill operated an interactive casino game in 
which the networked gaming system involved computers in multiple 
countries. 165  In the United Kingdom, where Menashe sued Hill, the 
                                                                                                                    
162 Ocean Science Engineering, Inc. v. United States, 595 F.2d 572, 574 (Ct. Cl. 1979) 
(“Perhaps the patent bar will note the possible loophole in the coverage of the U.S. patent 
laws and will invite the attention of Congress to it.”); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. 
Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009)(“When a patented process is 
practiced so that some steps are performed in the United States and other steps are 
performed offshore, the purloiner of the patented process may escape liability 
everywhere, for United States infringement is avoided if all of the process steps are not 
practiced in the United States, and infringement of foreign patents is avoided for the 
same reason. It cannot be that the legislators intended to enable avoidance of 
process patents by this ploy, while correcting it for machine patents. A statutory 
interpretation that results in all process inventions being seriously devalued, is not free of 
the charge of ‘absurd result.’”); M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Ltd., 890 
F.3d 995, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“What is particularly troubling in this case is that if U.S. 
law does not apply to infringing activity on a U.S.-flagged ship in international water, 
then it is possible no law applies.”).  
163 Apple has numerous Data Center Locations around the world, including in the United 
States, Denmark, and Hong Kong.  Apple Data Center Locations, BAXTEL.COM, 
https://baxtel.com/data-centers/apple#locations.   
164 Menashe Business Mercantile, Ltd. v. William Hill Organisation Ltd., [2002] EWCA 
(Civ) 1702, 2003 1 W.L.R. 1462 (Eng.).    
165 Id.  
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courts found that a user gambling at a computer in the United Kingdom 
used the patented method for online gambling in the United Kingdom, 
although the server accessed by the gaming system was located 
overseas.166  The courts found that the unauthorized use occurred within 
the United Kingdom patent boundaries, regardless of the geographic 
boundaries of the location of the server. 167   
Consider a similar case under the United States patent system.  Rehncohl 
holds a patent on an invention using a communications network to 
facilitate transactions between suppliers and consumers.168  Rehncohl 
patented a method of facilitating such transactions and the apparatus used 
to facilitate these transactions.169  Various Canadian and Irish corporations 
operated websites that use Rehncohl’s technology.  Users within the 
United States access the websites, but all data is maintained on 
international servers.170  The domestic users execute transactions using 
international resources benefiting by receiving information from the 
international servers.  Locating the code on international servers, however, 
insulates the international corporations from charges of infringement 
under United States patent law for the method of using the system. 171   
The system may still be infringed, even with part of the system located 
overseas, but the method of facilitating transactions using international 
servers controlled from the United States and benefitting the domestic user 
falls outside the United States patent code.172  To allow such 
circumnavigation of the patent boundaries hinders the progress of science 
and technology.  
Geographic boundaries are imposing fewer restrictions on information age 
innovations, frustrating the protections offered by the patent system to 
patentees.  The case law on extraterritoriality is complicated, evolving, 
and murky. Courts analyzing patent infringement impacted by 
extraterritoriality have chosen not to address the issue of 
extraterritoriality,173 have relied on narrow issues of statutory 
                                                                                                                    
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Renhcol, Inc. v. Don Best Sports, 548 F.Supp.2d 356 (E.D. Texas 2008).   
169 U.S. Patent No. 6,260,019 (issued July 10, 2001).   
170 Renhcol, 548 F.Supp.2d at 364.   
171 Renhcol, 548 F.Supp.2d at 366.   
172 Id.   
173 See, e.g., Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega,137 S.Ct. 734 (2017)(rather than focus 
on what aspects of the patent infringement occurred extraterritorially, the Supreme Court 
focused on the definition of component in section 271(f)); and Transocean Offshore 
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 400 F.Supp.2d 998 (S.D. Tx 
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construction,174 or held that the actions took place “outside of the 
territorial reach of any patent jurisdiction in the world.”175  A 
straightforward standard is needed to eliminate categories, set aside the 
patchwork blueprint for circumnavigating United States patent boundaries 
and delineate when a patented method is used within the United States.176   
Whoever without authority controls a patented method within the United 
States and benefits domestically from that method is a domestic user of 
that invention, regardless of whether the method covers the use of tangible 
or intangible assets.  The consistent erosion of patent boundaries has led to 
confusion, increased costs, and a weakening of the patent system.  It is 
time to strengthen the patent system and give United States patentees the 
full protection of their intellectual property rights.   
B. CIRCUMSCRIBING THE PATENT SYSTEM 
The public policy behind the protection of intellectual property seeks to 
balance competing interests. Traditionally, agreements regulated the 
sharing of intellectual property itself, securing for the owners of the 
intellectual property the exclusive right to control their intellectual 
property as envisioned by the Constitutional Convention of 1787.177  
Patents are territorial rights, giving patentees the ability to file for patents 
in different countries and to seek patent protection where available.  When 
the primary focus of innovation was tangible in nature, such a strict 
interpretation of territoriality may have made sense, but in the information 
                                                                                                                    
2005)(mobile offshore drilling rig was to be used in the Gulf of Mexico and the court did 
not address the question of whether such use actually was within the United States or not, 
treating the location of the drilling rig as within the United States with no discussion of 
the question of extraterritoriality).   
174 See, e.g., Microsoft v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (discussing the definition of 
component in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)).   
175 WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2015), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. WesternGeco LLC. v. ION Geophysical 
Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) 
176 Others have written about the concerns of applying United States law to foreign 
activities.  See, e.g., Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Note, Divided Infringement: Expanding 
the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U.L.REV. 281 (2007). Methods that are 
controlled within the United States and where the benefit accrues within the United 
States are within the United States for purposes of 35 U.S.C. 271(a) and there is no issue 
with comity and foreign jurisdiction.  In the same breath, if one step of a patented method 
occurs within the United States, but the benefit accrues elsewhere then no domestic use 
has occurred, and United States patent law does not govern.   
177 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;”).   
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age, such a rigid categorical reliance on geographic boundaries makes 
little sense.   
The territorial limitations United States patent law evolved in a time of 
patenting the tangible.  In 1856, the Supreme Court wrote that the U.S. 
patent laws “do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of 
the United States.”178  At issue in Brown v. Duchesne was a patented 
method of constructing boats. A French schooner sailed, under French 
flag, into Boston harbor.  The schooner had been made in France using the 
method patented in the United States.  The patentee claimed infringement 
when the schooner was in a United States port, even though the 
unauthorized use of the method had occurred in France.  The Supreme 
Court held that on board a foreign-flagged ship in United States waters, 
the patent laws of the country whose flag the ship flies apply.179 The 
Supreme Court found that “[t]he patent laws of the United States afford no 
protection to inventions beyond or outside of the jurisdiction of the United 
States.”180   
Not ten years later, in 1865, the question of patent boundaries arose 
again.181  An American ship on the high seas engaged in the unauthorized 
use of a patented method.182  The Massachusetts court held that 
unauthorized use of a patented invention infringes a United States patent if 
the unauthorized use occurs on “the decks of American vessels on the high 
seas, as much as it does to all the territory of the country.” 183  The 
“floating island” doctrine was thus born, wherein “[a] ship, which bears a 
nation’s flag, is to be treated as a part of the territory of that nation. A ship 
is a kind of floating island.”184  Therefore, under this concept, any use of a 
patented invention on a United States flagged ship occurs within the 
United States.   
In 1943, the United States government engaged in the unauthorized use of 
a patent after purchasing and using radio receivers from the Marconi 
Wireless Telephone Company of America.185  A number of patents 
                                                                                                                    
178 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856) 
179 Id.   
180 Id. 
181 Gardiner v. Howe, 9 F. Cas. 1157 (C.C.D. Mass. 1865) (No. 5,219).   
182 Id. 
183 Id.   
184 Patterson v. Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 176 (1903) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
185 The patent infringement suit specifically addresses the time period from “March 8, 
1913, when plaintiff first gave notice of infringement to the defendant, to August 16, 
1915, when the patent expired.”  Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of America v. United States, 
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covered the receivers, and during the term of the patent, the United States 
manufactured and built radio receivers without authorization.186  Ten such 
receivers were assembled and used at the United States Naval Radio 
Station at the American Legation in Peking.187 This use was found to be 
within the United States.188   
Relying on territoriality, Deepsouth Packing found a way to circumvent 
patent boundaries after it was found to have infringed Laitram’s patent on 
a machine for deveining shrimp.189  Deepsouth Packing made parts of the 
deveining machines in the United States, then sold the parts to foreign 
buyers along with instructions on how to assemble the machines once 
outside the United States.190  The Supreme Court held that this was not an 
unauthorized use within the United States, and, therefore, no infringement 
of Laitram’s patent occurred by Deepsouth’s exportation.191  Congress 
amended the patent code in 1984 to render such behavior infringement 
under section 271.192    
Each of the above scenarios involved tangible aspects of the alleged 
infringement.  In 1979, the validity of the doctrine of the “floating island” 
was challenged in the United States Court of Claims in a case alleging 
infringement of an intangible invention.193  Bascom patented a method of 
                                                                                                                    
99 Ct. Cl. 1, 1 (Ct. Cl. 1942), vacated in part on other grounds, aff’d in part, 320 U.S. 1 
(1943). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).   
190 Id. (“Deepsouth is entirely straightforward in indicating that its course of conduct is 
motivated by a desire to avoid patent infringement. Its president wrote a Brazilian 
customer: ‘We are handicapped by a decision against us in the United States. This was a 
very technical decision and we can manufacture the entire machine without any 
complication in the United States, with the exception that there are two parts that must 
not be assembled in the United States, but assembled after the machine arrives in 
Brazil.’”).   
191 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 527 (“The statute makes it clear that it is not an infringement 
to make or use a patented product outside of the United States….  in order to secure the 
injunction it seeks, Laitram must show … direct infringement by Deepsouth in the 
United States, that is, that Deepsouth ‘makes,’ ‘uses,’ or ‘sells' the patented product 
within the bounds of this country.”).   
192 See 130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).  
193 Ocean Science Engineering, 595 F.2d at 574 (In addressing the floating island 
doctrine, the Court of Claims stated “Perhaps the patent bar will note the possible 
loophole in the coverage of the U.S. patent laws and will invite the attention of Congress 
to it. Meanwhile, it is well to adjudicate cases on other grounds when possible”); see also 
Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976).   
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finding underwater objects.194  The United States government used 
Bascom’s patented technology without authorization on the high seas, 
outside the territorial reach of the United States.195  The Court of Claims 
suggested that if the Patent Act was strictly construed such use might not 
be found to be within the United States, and recommended that the “patent 
bar … note the possible loophole in the coverage of the U.S. patent laws 
and … invite the attention of Congress to it.”196  The information age 
nature of the invention was explicitly highlighted by the language of the 
court in addressing the intangible processes carried out.  Bascom was 
denied relief on other grounds, leaving the question of the floating island 
doctrine out to sea. 197   
Congress has historically recognized the territorial nature of patent law 
and the accompanying limitations.  In an age of continually eroding 
geographic boundaries, the argument could be made that given all the 
repeated codified expansions and limitations to the territorial reach of 
patent law, those areas left unaddressed must lie outside the patent 
boundaries.  Congress, however, has never indicated any Congressional 
intent to limit the territorial scope of patent boundaries.  Indeed, the 
numerous changes and amendments to the patent system reflect the fact 
that patent boundaries have expanded over time while technology has, 
simultaneously, eroded geographic boundaries.198   
The policies behind the protection of intellectual property do not support 
the enforcement of patent boundaries when the boundaries are being used 
primarily to frustrate public legislation. Patentees suffer the effects of such 
maneuvers.  Patent law is inherently territorial, and boundaries have a role 
in the commercialization of intellectual property and products that 
embody intellectual property. However, a balance must be struck between 
the territorial limitations on the enforcement of patent law and protecting 
the public’s interest in the promotion of the progress of science and the 
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195 Id.   
196 Id. 
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198 See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9, 28 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2402, 2422 (“This section … codifies the holding of the Supreme Court that use of a 
patented invention on board a foreign ship does not infringe a patent.”); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(f) (Congress responded to Deepsouth in 1984 by codifying as infringement the 
exportation of the components of a patented invention for indirect infringement 
internationally.); 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (In 1988, Congress codified as infringement the 
importation of a product made internationally by a domestically patented process, subject 
to certain limitations, in section 271(g)).   
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useful arts. The law needs to be applied as the policies behind it dictate, 
and patentees need to know what the boundaries are.  A patented 
invention controlled from within the United States, and accruing domestic 
benefit, is used within the United States, even if it is only available for use 
and the actual use will take place outside the traditional patent 
boundaries.199   
Whether the actions at question are over land, under sea, or geographically 
distant, if the action was controlled from within the geographic limits of 
the United States, and the benefit accrues within the United States, then 
the invention is being used within the United States.  Those who seek to 
avoid charges of unauthorized use, not the patentees themselves, are 
setting the norms.  Maintaining a balance between the public’s interest in 
access to technology, and the patentee’s interest in controlling that access 
promotes the progress of science and the useful arts  Circumnavigating 
and circumscribing patent boundaries raises numerous concerns and must 
be limited in its reach.   
There is presently a divide in the way that the courts evaluate 
extraterritoriality in method claims, system claims, and machine claims.  
Many patents indeed include both method and apparatus claims and 
patentees often assert both together, but even so, it is time to put an end to 
that divide200 and ask not what type of claim was drafted, but where the 
patented invention was used.  An invention is used in the location from 
where it is controlled and where it derives the benefit.201  If a patented 
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201 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(“The use 
of a claimed system … is the place at which the system as a whole is put into service, i.e., 
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process is practiced so that some steps are performed domestically and 
some steps are not, then it cannot be that the practitioner can be found not 
to be using the invention in any country.  The Supreme Court has written 
that patent infringement under United States law cannot be found when 
the acts predicating the finding of infringement are “wholly done in a 
foreign country.”202  However, when steps occur within and without the 
United States, then the unauthorized use does not wholly occur in any one 
country.  To find no liability under domestic patent law devalues domestic 
method patents.203  If an unauthorized use is controlled from within the 
United States and the benefit accrues within the United States, then the 
use takes place within the United States.    
1. ORIGINS OF THE CONTROL AND BENEFIT TEST 
In 1958, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decided Bac v. 
Loomis.204  The technology at issue involved a system for determining the 
location of a moving craft using two fixed points, and radio signals 
transmitted between the fixed points and the craft.   An early test of the 
invention involved setting up radio transmitting stations at Montauk, Long 
Island, and Fenwick Island, Delaware, and a monitoring station at 
Manahawkin, New Jersey.205  An aircraft in Bermuda was then tracked 
using signals sent from New York and Delaware.206  Similar tests were 
run using stations located in the United States and Canada.  The Patent 
Office Board of Patent Interferences, upon hearing the facts of the case 
stated that: 
We are inclined to view the operation of an integrated 
instrumentality, a substantial portion of which is within the United 
States, and which is operated by and for residents of the United 
States, as not removed from the United States by reason of the 
projection of some elements of the instrumentality beyond the 
political boundaries of the United States because of the space 
requirements of the instrumentality in its field of practical 
application.207    
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202  Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 650 (1915).   
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207 Rosen v. NASA, 152 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 757, *11 (P.T.O.Bd. App.1966) (quoting Bac v. 
Loomis, Patent Interference No. 84,143 (P.T.O.Bd. App. 1955) 
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Neither the Board nor the CCPA, upon appeal, went further with this 
inquiry, deciding the case on other grounds.208  The invention, controlled 
as it was from within the United States, was found to be within the United 
States, despite the location of the craft outside the United States.  This 
precedent establishes the idea that patent sovereignty and the 
accompanying patent boundaries can be extended to inventions controlled 
from the United States, even when such inventions are both within and 
without the United States.   
A few years later, in Decca, the United States was accused of patent 
infringement of a radio-based navigation system.209  The navigation 
system worked by broadcasting radio signals to aircraft and ships, 
allowing each craft to determine its location and navigate from there. 210  
The United States anticipated using the navigation system worldwide, but 
at the time of the infringement suit had only three broadcast stations for 
use with the system: two based in the United States and one based in 
Norway.211  The craft receiving the signals were not necessarily within the 
United States.  The question before the court was whether the system was 
used within the United States, and therefore potentially infringing the 
patent.  In answering the question, the court realized that there were 
different ways to find United States patent sovereignty.    
The alleged infringing navigation system transmitted signals to ships and 
aircraft bearing the United States flag.  The Court of Claims declined to 
apply the “law of the flag” to the unauthorized use, stating, in dicta, that 
they thought “a decision founded on the fiction that for purposes of the 
Patent Laws, United States ships and planes wherever found, are United 
States territory, would be founded on water.”212   
However, the court went on to discuss the question of control.  Extending 
the line of cases addressing United States patent sovereignty, the Court of 
Claims found that a master broadcasting station controlled the navigation 
system.  The master broadcasting station, located in Washington, D.C., 
monitored all stations, worldwide, and, thus, according to the court, “the 
necessarily scattered and changing position of receivers, with those 
actually functioning for the most part at sea, in or over the territory of no 
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sovereign, have [no] necessary connection with the location of the … 
system for purposes of the United States Patent Laws.”213  
[T]he whole … system must be deemed … to be a unity and the 
location of that unity must be deemed to be in United States 
territory. Here it has planted several of its feet, and use of United 
States territory is indispensable to it. The location of facilities in 
some foreign countries is also essential to the plan, but the 
selection of any single other country is, apparently, not essential. 
Any one such country could readily be abandoned for another.214 
Once again, the patent boundaries were measured by the location from 
where the invention was controlled, not the location of the actual 
invention itself.   
Continuing in the line of extraterritoriality and information age 
technology, in Rosen v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
the invention in question was the subject of a patent application entitled 
Method and Apparatus for Orienting a Satellite.215  The National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) awarded Hughes a 
contract to build satellites incorporating the invention.  At no point before 
filing for a patent was the invention reduced to practice since satellites 
using the invention “could not be made by Hughes or by anyone outside 
of Government, and only by the Government in a multimillion dollar 
venture.”216  The invention had to be used in outer space in order to be 
actually reduced to practice, given the claim language of the patent.  
Under the facts, in this case, proof of actual reduction to practice within 
the United States was required for patentability purposes.217  The decision 
found that the invention had been actually reduced to practice after NASA 
launched a satellite incorporating the technology.  “[A]t the time of the 
successful orbital maneuvers, [said satellite] was irretrievably located 
22,000 miles in space and over South America.”218  Actual reduction to 
practice had occurred — but had it occurred “within the United States”? 
The Patent Office Board of Patent Interferences (“Board”) found that the 
satellite containing the invention had been controlled from NASA’s 
Goddard Space Flight Center, located in Maryland. 219  Thus, the invention 
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was controlled  “within the United States” and the Board viewed “the 
operation of … the satellite and its control point … as not removed from 
the United States by reason of the satellite being necessarily distant from 
the several states of the United States.”220  In other words, as long as 
control remained within the United States, the United States patent laws 
extend to the invention.  Sovereignty and the patent boundaries are 
determined by the location of the control point, and not the location of the 
invention itself.    
In 1973, Hughes sued the United States government for patent 
infringement on their patent for a spacecraft control system. 221  At issue 
was the liability of the government for multiple spacecraft used in a 
variety of international projects.222  Although the spacecraft was not 
operated within the domestic boundaries of the United States, the United 
States government was found liable for infringement. 223   
Two of the satellites were a joint project between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United States, built in Germany and launched from Cape 
Canaveral, Florida.  “NASA’s main role following launch was to provide 
tracking and data acquisition services during some phases of the 
mission.”224  After launch, the “attitude control systems were first 
activated in space shortly after separation from the launch vehicles.”225  
The Court of Federal Claims found that “NASA’s launch of both of the 
spacecraft constituted a use of the patented invention.” 226  
A joint project between the United States and the European Space Agency 
(ESA) to launch a series of satellites resulted in more charges of 
infringement by Hughes. 227  Two satellites were “designed and 
constructed by NASA at Goddard Space Center” under this contract, and 
launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida.228  The Court of Federal Claims 
found that NASA launched the satellite from Florida as part of “a joint 
program and not as a disinterested party.” 229  The launch site was 
controlled by the United States, and the United States benefited from the 
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satellite. 230  These combined to make the use one with in the United States 
— even if the actual infringement did not occur until outer space. 231   
The AMPTE UKS program provides an interesting contrast to the Cape 
Canaveral launched satellites.232  The AMPTE UKS satellites were built 
overseas under various agreements and launched by NASA.233  NASA did 
not track the satellites nor did the United States government receive any 
further benefit other than that of being part of a joint project.234  The Court 
of Federal Claims found no infringement within the United States as the 
satellite was only temporarily present within the United States and, 
therefore, 35 U.S.C. § 272 provided a complete defense to a charge of 
infringement.235     
In another joint program, a satellite was built by the United Kingdom and 
launched by NASA.236  The launch took place off the coast of Africa but 
was tracked by engineers at Goddard Space Center in Greenbelt, 
Maryland.237   The Court of Federal Claims found too tenuous a 
connection with the United States for the spacecraft to fall within United 
States patent boundaries.  
Use has a broad definition, as Judge Turner wrote in his Hughes’ decision.  
That breadth expands the patent boundaries of the United States.  
Expansion is not unlimited, however.   Focusing on the word use, the 
court found that a “device may be ‘used’ in many different ways, and all 
uses that rely on the teachings of a patent constitute infringement.”238  The 
invention at issue here, an attitude control system for a satellite, “cannot 
be activated until the spacecraft separates from the launch vehicle in 
space.” 239  However, at the time of the launch, the attitude control system 
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must necessarily, due to the nature of the invention, be present on the 
satellite.  The Court of Federal Claims found that the very presence of the 
invention may be enough to bring the invention within domestic patent 
boundaries if control and benefit remain within the United States.240   
Technology has eroded geographic boundaries.  Patentees face 
unprecedented rates of encroachment on their intellectual property rights. 
Unauthorized use is categorically determined to be either domestic or not.  
Such strict categorization, when combined with the erosion of 
technological boundaries, devalues the patent system.  The combination of 
control and benefit and a connection to the territorial grounds of the 
United States bring the invention within the United States patent 
boundaries and subject to United States sovereignty.  
C. RESETTING PATENT BOUNDARIES 
Geographic boundary limitations have resulted in direct limitations on the 
rights of patentees in a world that knows few technological boundaries.241  
These limitations have induced potential infringers to expand the scope of 
their activities ever further, and transactions that are controlled from the 
United States and benefit those in the United States are characterized as 
extraterritorial transactions.  Bringing a suit for infringement when the 
situs of the infringement is unclear is an expensive gamble.  Applying the 
traditional normative justifications for the protection of patentees’ interest 
to such transactions can help determine where the transactions are taking 
place, and, therefore, what laws apply.  Clarifying the location of the use 
will lead to less circumnavigation of the patent boundaries.  Allowing 
potential infringers to avoid the United States patent laws by locating a 
server or a single step in another country will have a chilling effect on 
risk-averse innovators who are already struggling with the question of 
what patent-eligible subject matter in the first place is.  Tailoring the 
inquiry to determine why and how the invention is being used, where the 
innovation is controlled from, and where the benefit of the invention is 
derived.  Section 101 does not provide different protection for the four 
categories of patent-eligible subject matter, and our judicial system should 
not set different patent boundaries for systems, machines, or processes.  
Today’s intangible innovations flow smoothly across geographic 
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boundaries and raise many questions that are more readily addressed in 
the world of tangible innovations.  The answers to those questions, 
however, should not be different based on the tangible nature of the 
invention.  Resetting the patent boundaries to reflect the intentions behind 
the patent laws requires the evaluation of several relevant factors:   
• Where will the invention be perceived as being practiced by 
the users? 
• Does the unauthorized user know of the patent at the time of 
the unauthorized use? 
• What are the terms of the arrangement leading to the question 
of whether the invention is being practiced within the United 
States? 
• What are the nature of the intellectual property and the 
character of the commercial embodiment? 242 
• How is the pricing of the agreement structured, what aspects 
are occurring where, and to whom does the financial benefit of 
the invention accrue?243 
• What is the commercial relationship between the site where 
potential infringement could occur and the site where control 
of the invention is retained? 
• What is the established profitability of the invention; how 
commercially successful is it, and what is its current 
popularity? 
These factors are discussed in the subsequent subsections.  
1. PERCEPTION OF USE 
Where the user of the innovation perceives the innovation as being used 
should factor significantly into the location of the use of the innovation.  
To determine the perception of use, a court must ascertain the intent of the 
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parties in practicing the innovation, as well as the location of the benefit 
received and the control over the invention.  Taken together, these reflect 
the perceived location of the innovation and therefore guide the courts in 
delineating the nature and scope of the use and determining which patent 
laws apply to the alleged infringement.   
If the location of the invention is unambiguous, then the courts should 
apply the relevant laws, and treat the infringement as domestic or 
international.  It is common, however, particularly in the realm of the 
intangible, for the location of the use of the innovation to be challenging 
to determine and to differ from at least one parties’ characterization of the 
use.  Even when a contract is expressly entered into in another country, or 
steps are taken to locate elements of the invention extraterritorially, the 
circumstances surrounding the use may contradict the first interpretation 
of the invention’s situs, and so courts must look to the substance of the 
use, not merely the strict geographic constraints.   
O’Brien patented a radio based navigation system.244  The system worked 
by broadcasting radio signals to ships and aircraft, allowing each craft to 
determine its location and navigate from there.245  The signals were sent 
from a device within the United States to a ship bearing a United States 
flag via a broadcast tower in Norway.246  The essence of the invention 
required that steps of the invention must take place outside of the United 
States and that the method of using the invention must involve steps 
outside the United States.247  The United States Court of Claims 
determined that the invention was used within the United States as the 
navigator receiving the signals was operating within the United States and 
retaining the benefit of the invention.248  The perception of use was that 
the benefit was retained within the United States, and the court held that, 
despite having extraterritorial components, the patented system was used 
within the United States.249   
The question of perception of use has been addressed by other countries 
and can be informative as to the application here.  As discussed in section 
IV.A above, the United Kingdom courts found that a user gambling at a 
computer in the United Kingdom used the patented method for online 
gambling in the United Kingdom, despite the fact that the server was 
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located overseas.250  The overseas location of the server was not apparent 
to the user, and all benefit reaped from the unauthorized use occurred 
within the United Kingdom patent boundaries, regardless of the 
geographic boundaries of the location of the server. 251   
In order to determine the location of the infringing use of the invention, 
the court must apply both an objective and subjective standard to 
determine where the user perceived the use to have occurred, where the 
benefit accrued and where control of the use remained.  The subjective 
nature may be difficult to determine from the evidence, and the courts 
may be forced to extrapolate the subjective nature from an evaluation of 
the relevant terms of the use.  Merely labeling a transaction as a domestic 
or international transaction or use cannot control.   
2. KNOWLEDGE OF PATENT 
To use an invention within the United States, without authorization, is to 
infringe the invention, even when such use is innocent, and the user lacks 
any knowledge of the patent.  To be vicariously liable for another’s 
unauthorized use of an invention, the party who is responsible for 
another’s indirect infringement must have known or must have been 
willfully blind of the existence of the patent.252  To find an unauthorized 
use occurs within the United States, when not every step occurs, or 
element of the patent exists within the geographic boundaries of the 
United States, that same heightened standard must apply.  It is essential to 
distinguish between those seeking to circumnavigate United States patent 
boundaries and innocent parties.  In order to find patent infringement 
within the United States, when extraterritoriality exists, it is reasonable to 
ask whether a potential infringer knew or should have known of the patent 
at issue.253  Users should not be required to perform an international patent 
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search when practicing an invention across territorial boundaries unless 
those users are seeking to circumnavigate the territorial reach of United 
States patent law.  Vicarious liability can be found when an accused 
infringer took “deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of 
wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the 
critical facts.”254  If a user knows, or should have known of a United 
States patent, and takes steps to circumnavigate the protection of United 
States patent laws then that user should be held to the same standard as 
one infringing the patent entirely within the United States.  Geographic 
boundaries are continually eroding, and patent boundaries should not be 
held to the same rigid definitions as geographic boundaries.   
In 1993, the ITC investigated the importation of disk drives containing 
sputtered carbon coated disks.255  In that investigation, the named 
respondents manufactured sputtered carbon coated disks in the United 
States and shipped those disks overseas for assembly into disk drives. 256  
When respondents did so, they did so with the knowledge that most of the 
assembled disk drives would be imported into the United States infringing 
U.S. Patent No. Re 32,464.257  In a statement of the additional views of 
three Commissioners, the ITC wrote that there must be a nexus between 
the unfair acts, such as patent infringement, that give rise to jurisdiction 
under section 337, and the importation, sale for importation or domestic 
sale after importation.258  The Commissioners wrote that in order for the 
respondents who shipped the disks overseas to be held responsible for the 
unfair act, the respondents must have known or should have known that 
the goods would be subsequently exported to the United States.259  In 
other words, whether the manufacturer of the sputtered carbon coated disk 
drives was located within the United States or not made no difference in 
the culpability of the manufacturer.260  Culpability, instead, depends on 
whether the manufacturer knew or should have known that the 
manufacturer’s sale would lead to the goods being domestically and 
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unlawfully imported. Knowledge of the patents supplies the nexus 
between the territoriality of the unauthorized use and the situs of every 
step along the way.   
Knowledge of the patent may also allow a party not to be an unauthorized 
user of a domestic method.  If post-publication a party uses a method to 
create the disclosed invention, but before the patent issues the party 
exports the product, then there is no unauthorized use within the United 
States.261  Similarly, practicing a patented method wholly abroad that 
would infringe within the United States, even when the party is enjoined 
from unauthorized domestic use does not implicate United States patent 
law.262  In each of these scenarios, the party used knowledge of the patent 
to avoid unauthorized domestic use of the technology — but did not seek 
to circumvent domestic geographic boundaries either. 
United States Patent No. 8,070,847 is directed to a method of 
straightening patient’s teeth without using traditional metal braces.  The 
patented method requires taking an impression of the patient’s teeth, 
creating a computer model of the impression, and using a 3D printer to 
print a series of retainers that are then worn by the patient to straighten her 
teeth.263  A dentist, living within the United States, who takes an 
impression of her patient’s teeth, uploads the impression to the internet, 
pays a Pakistani company to create a computer model of the impression in 
Pakistan, downloads the computer model and prints the retainers in her 
domestic office should be found to infringe the patent.  Under NTP v. 
RIM, in order for this to be an unauthorized use, every step must occur 
within the United States.  Such method exceptionalism264 cannot make 
sense.  If the dentist knows, or should know of, the patent, and is 
intentionally circumnavigating the domestic patent boundaries, then that 
creates the nexus for unlawful domestic use.  To find otherwise takes the 
teeth out of United States patent law in the information age.   
3. THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT 
The terms of the agreement should be carefully examined in determining 
where infringement of the patent occurs.  A transaction that takes place in 
a foreign country but contemplates delivery of the product into the United 
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States is placing the patented invention on sale within the United States.265  
Such a sale, if unauthorized, is infringement of the United States patent, 
even if the sale takes place overseas.  Similarly, a sale that occurs within 
the United States for a device assembled abroad and sold internationally is 
not a sale under United States patent law because the terms of the 
agreement dictate delivery overseas and never contemplate the invention 
being brought within the United States patent boundaries. 266 The 
determining factor is not the “location of the offer, but rather the location 
of the future sale that would occur pursuant to the offer.”267  In each of 
these scenarios, the terms of the agreement control the location of the 
infringement.  By analogy, if the terms of the agreement expressly provide 
for control of the invention to be domestic and the benefit of the invention 
to also remain within the United States, then the invention should be 
considered to be used within the United States — regardless of the 
location of the steps and device.  Since this example contemplates the use 
and not the sale, the terms should only be examined for guidance, but 
remain an critical part of the determination when an intangible invention 
crosses geographic boundaries.   
Looking at this factor through the eyes of the dentist — if the dentist 
performs, without authorization, a step, or a series of steps outside the 
United States geographic boundaries, the terms of the agreement can help 
differentiate between the dentist contemplating delivery of the final 
product within the United States and the dentist contemplating delivery 
outside the United States.  If the benefit is domestic and the control over 
the device remains within the United States as dictated by the language of 
the transaction, then the transaction should fall under the protection of the 
United States patent system, regardless of the location of each step along 
the way.268   
The terms of the agreement dictate the location of the sale of an article — 
and, by analogy, they should also provide guidance as to the location of 
the use of the article.  A method may be used across geographic 
                                                                                                                    
265 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore 
Deepwater Drilling, 2013 WL 4539900 at 4 (U.S. 2013)[hereinafter Maersk Brief].   
266 M2M Sols. LLC v. Motorola Sols., Inc., No. CV 12-33-RGA, 2016 WL 70814, at *18 
(D. Del. Jan. 6, 2016).   
267 Maersk Brief at 4.   
268 See, e.g., M2M Sols., 2016 WL 70814; Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, 
Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).   
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boundaries. 269  If such use is governed by terms and conditions that 
dictate that the benefit is contemplated to be domestic, and that control 
remains within the geographic boundaries of the United States, then the 
use should be found to be within the United States as well, regardless of 
where each step takes place.270  Under that scenario, the terms of the 
transaction indicate that the method is being used within the United States 
as well — even if a step takes place outside the geographic boundaries.   
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the 
terms of the agreement over the actual location of the infringement — 
stating that to do otherwise would be to elevate form over substance.271   
In 2004, GlowProducts, a Canadian company, sold and shipped products, 
including artificial, lighted “ice cubes” from a Canadian website to 
customers located in the United States.272  Vanderschuit owns a patent on 
an artificial, lighted “ice cube” and sued GlowProducts for patent 
infringement.273  GlowProducts sold the infringing “ice cubes” from their 
British Columbia facility, but the language of the transactions clearly 
stated that the destination for the purchased products was the United 
States, and included shipping charges for the destinations specified by the 
purchases.274  The sales were, therefore, found to be United States sales. 
275   The terms of the deal dictated the location of the infringing sale.   
In 2005, two American companies signed a contract in Norway for the 
sale of an offshore drilling rig.276  The contract, signed outside the United 
States geographic boundaries, explicitly stated that the oil rig was to for 
use in the Gulf of Mexico.277 Before the rig was delivered, a suit for patent 
infringement was brought based solely on the contract executed and 
signed in Norway. 278  At the time the parties entered into the contract, the 
                                                                                                                    
269 The Federal Circuit has expressed great skepticism as to whether it is possible to sell a 
method or not.  If it is not possible to sell a method, then it is certainly not possible to sell 
one across geographic boundaries.  See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1319.     
270 Id.     
271 Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
272 Id.   
273 Id.   
274 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., 2007 
1833252, *1 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
275 Id. 
276 Response Brief for Defendant, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. 
Maersk Constractors USA, Inc., 2009 WL 1612927 (S.D.Tex.) 
277 Id. 
278 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk 
Contractors USA, Inc., 2009 WL 5070048 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Furthermore, the oilrig was 
modified before it was delivered to the Gulf of Mexico, and Transocean continued to 
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vessel was under construction in Singapore, and the fact that during the 
time between the sale of the vessel and the delivery of the offshore drilling 
rig to the Gulf of Mexico, the seller modified the vessel so that it no 
longer used the patented technology, the sale was found to be governed by 
United States patent law.279   
Emphasizing again that the language of the transaction controls the 
location of the infringement when two companies entered into a contract 
within the United States for the sale of a patented invention manufactured 
and delivered overseas, the sale was found to be outside the scope of the 
domestic patent laws.280  The District of Delaware focused on the 
language included in the contract stating that the accused products, 
manufactured abroad, would be shipped to a contract manufacturer, also 
abroad, to determine that the terms of the transaction controlled the 
location of the sale, which was found to be outside both the United States 
geographic boundaries and the United States patent boundaries.281  A 
similar outcome arose from a contract between two U.S. companies 
entered into in the United States for the sale “of a patented invention with 
delivery and performance outside of the United States.”282  
Infringement differentiates neither between the types of infringing uses 
nor the nature of the goods themselves.  If an unauthorized party makes, 
uses, sells, offers to sell or imports the innovation, then that party 
infringes the patent.  When the Federal Circuit looked to the language of 
the transaction to expand the definition of “within the United States” for 
purposes of selling or offering to sell, the definition similarly expanded for 
use.  If the terms of the transaction state that the benefit of the invention 
remains within the United States, then the invention is more likely to be 
within the United States patent boundaries, even if a step or element 
occurs outside the United States geographic boundaries.  The terms are not 
                                                                                                                    
assert that its infringement claim was based on the “rig that was the subject of the sale or 
offer for sale between Maersk and Statoil” the version of the oilrig before it was 
modified.  Brief for Defendant-Appellee, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. 
v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 2010 WL 467515 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
279 To make this even more interesting, the patents on the technology in question has 
been declared invalid in Norway and severely curtailed by the European Union — so 
limited suits could have been brought in the country where the transaction actually took 
place.  Amicus Curiae Brief of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark in Support of 
Petitioner, Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 
2013 WL 4049457 at 3 (S.Ct. 2013).   
280 M2M Sols. LLC v. Motorola Sols., Inc., No. CV 12-33-RGA, 2016 WL 70814, *18 
(D. Del. Jan. 6, 2016).   
281 Id.   
282 Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Techs., L.L.C. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 964 F. 
Supp. 2d 653, 657 (E.D. Tex. 2013) 
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controlling — but can help determine the location of the potential 
infringement. 
4. THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE CHARACTER OF ITS COMMERCIAL EMBODIMENT 
The nature of the intellectual property and the character of its commercial 
embodiment need to be considered in determining whether an 
unauthorized domestic use has occurred or not.  Software provides an 
example of the inherent nature of the intellectual property and the 
character of its commercial embodiment.  Software itself is intangible.  
However, when software is saved to a physical object, such as a disk, USB 
drive, or external hard drive, then there is a tangible object.  The 
commercial embodiment of each of these types of intellectual property is 
very different, and that character needs to be taken into account in 
determining whether an act that takes place across geographic boundaries 
falls under the United States patent system or not.   
The character of the commercial embodiment and the nature of the 
intellectual property should not allow infringers to avoid errors in claim 
drafting.  If the claims are drafted so that the act can never take place 
within the United States, then that is an uninfringeable claim — regardless 
of the nature of the invention.283  If the claimed commercial embodiment 
is a telephone system that requires two different local networks in two 
different countries — then the control and benefit are in neither country, 
and no domestic use of the invention has occurred.  If the claimed 
commercial embodiment, on the other hand, is a telephone system that 
uses a domestic network to send a signal to an extraterritorial network and 
then uses the domestic network to receive the signal domestically, that is 
an embodiment that could be used domestically.  Poor claim drafting 
cannot be overcome by a claim for control and benefit from within the 
United States.  The claimed invention is what is protected.   
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard 
arguments in NTP v. RIM, better known as the BlackBerry case.284  The 
main issue in the litigation focused on whether an invention was within 
the United States “if a component or step of the patented invention is 
located or performed abroad.”285  The invention in question was a system 
                                                                                                                    
283 See, e.g., Technology Patents, LLC v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 573 F.Supp.2d 903 (D. 
Md. 2008); aff’d sub no. Tech. Patents LLC v. T-Mobile (UK) Ltd., 700 F.3d 482 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012).   
284 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1315.   
285 Id.   
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and a method for the wireless exchange of email.286  The unlicensed 
competing system and method both relied on a Canadian server.287  The 
remainder of the system was located within the United States, and all 
other steps of the method of delivering the email were located within the 
United States.288  
The Federal Circuit held that “the use of a claimed system … is the place 
at which the system as a whole is put into service, i.e., the place where 
control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the system 
obtained.”289  In other words, the location of one component in Canada did 
not remove the system from being used within the United States.  If the 
system is controlled from and the benefit of the system is within the 
United States, then according to the Federal Circuit, the system is within 
the United States.290  In differentiating between the tangible and 
intangible, the Federal Circuit reached a different conclusion with regards 
to the method of using the system, holding that “the concept of ‘use’ of a 
patented method or process is fundamentally different from the use of a 
patented system or device.”291  The Federal Circuit held that a “process 
cannot be used ‘within’ the United States … unless each of the steps is 
performed within this country.”292  This is a distinction without meaning.   
An innovative system invention falls within United States patent 
boundaries, if it is controlled from within the United States, even if every 
component is not within the United States.  Under this holding, if a 
method is at issue, it cannot be within United States patent boundaries 
unless every step of the method occurs within the United States.  In 
differentiating between method and system claims the Federal Circuit flew 
in the face of the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) that states that the 
unauthorized use of an invention within the United States is patent 
infringement.293  Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 patentable inventions include 
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.294  
Neither statute differentiates between types of inventions.  Nor should 
such a differentiation be made.  Users of systems and methods who are 
located in the United States, who control and derive benefit from those 
systems and methods, even if a component or step is located overseas, use 
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287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
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293 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).   
294 35 U.S.C. § 101.   
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those devices in the United States.  The distinction made between methods 
and systems by the courts is one example of the non-textually driven 
wedge between patenting the intangible and tangible.   
A potential domestic infringer who accesses a website in Ireland is using 
that website in the United States.  A potential domestic infringer who 
mails a USB drive to Ireland containing a piece of software that the Irish 
user then makes a copy of, installs the copy in Ireland, runs the program, 
and mails back a USB drive containing the results is not using the Irish 
component of the software in the United States.295  It is not an 
unauthorized domestic use if the potential infringer controls the USB drive 
and benefits from the use of the software in Ireland.296  Current network 
technology makes using the Irish website in the United States seamless.  
The user does not need to know, nor does the user usually care, exactly 
where the software is located — as long as the user retains the benefit of 
using the software.  In the United Kingdom, the courts expressly 
recognized this — finding that “a server in Antigua was ‘used’ in the U.K. 
when bets were placed over a computer network from a U.K. client, even 
though the processing at the heart of the patented gaming system actually 
occurred in Antigua.”297  Physically mailing the USB device is not 
seamless, and the installation of the software in Ireland is not controlled 
from within the United States.  The character of the commercial 
embodiment is fundamentally different in each of these scenarios.  
Sending email, using software across a network, controlling a method 
from within the United States, and retaining the domestic benefit all are 
examples of intellectual property embodied in a fashion that defies 
geographic boundaries.  As such, the question should not be where each 
step of the method or each component of the system is located — but 
rather, the focus should turn on where the control and benefit are retained.  
Commercial embodiments of intellectual property that require the user to 
cross geographic boundaries to perform the process physically are less 
likely to be used or controlled from within the United States.   
5. THE PRICING STRUCTURE AND ACCRUAL OF 
FINANCIAL BENEFIT 
Under trademark law, one of the main factors that comes into play in 
determining whether domestic laws cover an international act of 
trademark infringement is the impact of the alleged infringer’s conduct on 
                                                                                                                    
295 Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).   
296 Id.   
297 Menashe, 1 W.L.R. 1462. 
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domestic commerce.298   This factor relies heavily on where the infringer 
accrued financial benefit from the alleged infringement.  If the infringer 
accrues financial benefit domestically, then even the international act may 
be covered by the domestic trademark laws.  If an unauthorized user 
accrues domestic financial benefit because of a process that occurs across 
geographic boundaries, that domestic financial benefit should be taken 
into consideration in determining whether a domestic use of the invention 
has occurred.   
There are limits to the importance of this factor, however.  Under 
copyright law, an international infringement that results in business 
transactions taking place within the United States is not enough to render 
the copyright domestically infringed.  Despite the domestic exchange of 
money, if all potential unauthorized use occurs extraterritorially, then the 
infringement itself is not domestic.  A domestic financial benefit is not 
enough to find a domestic infringement.299  The accrual of financial 
benefit is one aspect of the transaction to be considered, but it is not 
enough, in and of itself, to render the use to be one within the United 
States patent boundaries.  Otherwise, domestic companies with an 
international presence could find themselves liable for domestic patent 
infringement based on international transactions, simply because the 
corporate headquarters are located in Delaware.   
On the other hand, changing the pricing structure so that all financial 
benefit accrues outside the United States is not enough to lead to a 
determination that the asserted unauthorized use did not occur within the 
United States, either.  The benefits of unauthorized use are not merely 
monetary.  Unauthorized use can impact the income to the patentee 
through a diversion of sales, loss of licensing opportunities, a decrease in 
the market value of the license arrangement, depression in value of the 
product or other non-monetary detriments.300 
6. COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SITES OF 
USE AND CONTROL 
There are many times when the sites of the use, control, and 
extraterritorial steps are all connected commercially.  To determine the 
                                                                                                                    
298 Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 
U.S. 871 (1956). 
299 Quantitative Fin. Software, Ltd. v. Infinity Fin. Tech., Inc., No. 97 CIV. 7879 (LMM), 
1998 WL 427710, *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1998).  
300  Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Divided Infringement: Expanding the Extraterritorial 
Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 281, 303 (2007). 
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situs for an infringing use of networked technology, of technology used 
outside of traditional geographic boundaries, and of technology that 
benefits from its extraterritorial nature, the commercial relationship 
between sites of use and control must be considered.  When seeking a 
patent on operating a naval base “located offshore, preferabl[y] in 
international waters”,301 a patent on a pneumatic conveyance system for 
offshore oil drilling rigs, 302 or a patent on a “refrigeration apparatus for 
cooling containers and food in the microgravity conditions of outer space” 
303 then it is clear that the benefit is accruing somewhere besides the 
location of the actual invention.  In these scenarios, the commercial 
relationship between the sites of use and benefit may help determine 
where the invention is being used for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 271.      
In 2003, Constellation Services, Inc., a commercial space services 
company, received a patent titled: “Method and apparatus for supplying 
orbital space platforms using payload canisters via intermediate orbital 
rendezvous and docking.”304   One anticipated use of this patented method 
is to deliver goods to the International Space Station.305  To practice the 
patent, a party would launch a supply canister into orbit using a launch 
vehicle, dock the canister to an intermediate space vehicle and transfer the 
canister to the International Space Station, for instance.306  If the method 
delivers goods to the United States module, then current law says that this 
method is delivering goods to the United States.  If the method delivers 
goods to the Russian, Canadian, Japanese, or European module or 
laboratory,307 then the only tangible connection to the United States could 
                                                                                                                    
301 U.S. Patent No. 5,189,978 (issued March 2, 1993).  
302 M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Ltd., 890 F.3d 995, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 
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potentially be the launch from the United States.308  There is no way for 
every step of this method to occur within the United States.309  The use of 
the “intermediate space vehicle to position the supply canister relative to 
the space platform”  must occur in outer space, which is not subject to 
United States patent law.  Congress has extended United States patent law 
“to applicable activities conducted in outer space.”310  Inventions in outer 
space are expressly “within the United States” if the invention is “made, 
used or sold in outer space on a space object or component thereof under 
the jurisdiction or control of the United States” unless the “space object … 
is specifically identified and otherwise provided for by an international 
agreement” or the space object is registered to a foreign state.311  
However, this does not take into account the positioning of the supply 
canister — which is taking place in outer space.     
Microsoft produces, distributes and hosts software worldwide.312  Its data 
centers, services, and facilities are located around the globe.313  Machalek 
invented software that extracted relevant data from a customer 
relationship management database and imported it into spreadsheets.314  
Machalek sued Microsoft for its unauthorized use of Machalek’s 
software.315  If Microsoft controlled the use of its software from within the 
United States and benefited from that use, even if the software was stored 
on a non-domestic server, Microsoft is engaging in unauthorized domestic 
use of Machalek’s invention. 316   Microsoft’s ownership and the on-going 
commercial relationship between the location of the software and the 
location of the user provides a basis for finding the method is controlled 
from within the United States.  If Microsoft benefits from this use, then 
the method is being domestically used without authorization.   
                                                                                                                    
308 There are less than two dozen launch sites worldwide that operate on a regular basis, 
and of these, four are in the United States.  SPACE TODAY ONLINE, SPACE LAUNCH SITES 
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The reverse is also true. Microsoft licenses software such as Microsoft 
Office to individuals.  In order to use that software, the individual must 
activate the software with Microsoft’s Product Activation technology.  
Foreign software licensees may activate the software through the 
Microsoft Clearinghouse located in the United States.317  Microsoft 
controls this system from within the United States, and the system extends 
a domestic benefit to Microsoft and the user.  The method of activation is 
being used within the United States, even as the activating party is outside 
the United States.318 
The focus must remain on the location from where the technology is 
controlled, and the location where the benefit is derived.  If a Pakistani 
company creates an electronic catalog in Pakistan by crawling the web to 
visit websites located in the United States, that company is not creating 
the catalog within the United States.  The visit to a domestic website by a 
Pakistani computer or computer operator seeking information to be used 
and stored in Pakistan remains a Pakistani use of the website.319  The visit 
is controlled from Pakistan, and the benefit is accrued in Pakistan.  
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (Transocean), an Anglo-
Australian company, holds several United States patents for methods and 
apparatus for offshore drilling.320  As the name suggests, much of offshore 
drilling takes place outside the geographic boundaries of the United States 
— and the value and benefit of this technology require protection beyond 
the strict geographic boundaries of the United States.  Transocean learned 
that its patented technology was being used, without permission, in the 
Gulf of Mexico — in an area located within the United States Exclusive 
Economic Zone.321  The courts found this use was to be within the United 
States, and Transocean was able to pursue its claim of infringing use by 
the unauthorized parties.322    WesternGeco owns several patents on a 
                                                                                                                    
317 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.Supp.2d 147, 156 (2009).   
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319 CNET Networks, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc., 528 F.Supp. 2d 985, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2007).  
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uses of the sea.”  Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (Mar. 10, 
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device for and a method of gathering information about the ocean floor.323  
The device and method were used, without authorization, in the Chukchi 
Sea, also located in the United States EEZ.  This use was not found to be 
within the United States.324  There is no easy way to differentiate between 
the location of the infringement in these two cases.  The focus of the issue 
ought not to be whether the use has occurred in the EEZ or not — but 
rather what is the relationship between the commercial site of the use, the 
EEZ, and the commercial site receiving the benefit of the use, and from 
where that use is controlled.  In the case of aquatic exploration and 
offshore mining, it is often easier to determine the location of the benefit 
than the location of the use itself.   
There are many examples of patents that have domestic value in their 
extraterritorial use.  Allowing unauthorized users to benefit from the 
extraterritorial aspects, while sheltering the same users from section 271 
undermines the very values of our patent system.  When there is a 
commercial relationship between the sites of use and control, the use 
should be found to be domestic.  When the value of the invention is its 
extraterritorial application, to hold otherwise would be to remove all 
potential protections from such inventions, and to discourage innovation 
in the ever-expanding technological reaches of our physical world.   
7. INTENT 
Proof of an incentive to practice a patent without authorization must be 
more than proof of knowledge (known or should have known) of the 
United States patents.  There must be a nexus between knowledge of the 
United States patents and an intention to circumvent the territorial 
limitations of United States patent law.  United States patent laws should 
not be construed to penalize domestic companies or companies that 
contribute significantly to the domestic economy as compared to foreign 
competitors.  However, any company that seeks to circumvent United 
States patent boundaries by playing games, should be subject to United 
States patent laws if the unauthorized use is controlled within the United 
States, the financial benefit accrues within the United States, and there is 
                                                                                                                    
323 WesternGeco, LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015).   
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an incentive to avoid becoming an authorized user of the patented 
technology.   
Power Integrations and Fairchild are direct competitors in the power 
supply controller chip market.325  Power Integration owns several patents 
on power supply controller chips,326 which ensure that the power supply 
functions properly.327  Power Integration sued Fairchild for patent 
infringement.  In the suit, Power Integration argued that Fairchild made 
international chip sales to induce domestic infringement.  The Federal 
Circuit found that, although no single piece of evidence was individually 
sufficient to show intent, the evidence as a whole provided a basis for a 
potential finding of induced infringement.   In other words, knowledge of 
the patent and intent to profit were not enough — there also had to be an 
intention on Fairchild’s part to profit off of the unauthorized domestic use 
of the international product sales.  In finding such a basis, the Federal 
Circuit looked at Fairchild’s actions concerning its chips.   
Fairchild promoted its chips as complying with regulations specific to the 
United States, including the California Energy Commission and Energy 
Star Level 5 standards. 328  These standards are specific to the United 
States, and in fact, are less stringent than the European Union’s 
standards.329  In addition, Fairchild states that it stands behind its products 
and indemnifies its customers against suits for infringement of United 
States patents.330  Fairchild further targeted customers in the United States 
through its advertising and its website. 331  As a whole, the Federal Circuit 
                                                                                                                    
325 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 843 F.3d 1315, 1320 
(Fed. Cir. 2016).   
326 Fairchild is also the holder of several patents in this space, but this discussion focuses 
on Fairchild’s unauthorized use of Power Integrations’ patented technology.  Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Power Integrations’ Non-Confidential Opening Brief, Power Integrations, Inc. v. 
Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., 2015 WL 6061894, 43 (Fed. Cir. 2015).    
329 Power Integrations, 843 F.3d at 1334 (“The jury also heard testimony that, while other 
countries initially adopted the United States energy efficiency standards, certain countries 
had established different, more stringent standards of their own.”).   
330 Litigation Update, FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCTOR, 
https://www.fairchildsemi.com/about/media/litigation-update/ (“We stand behind our 
products. Our worldwide terms and conditions of sale include industry-standard 
indemnification for patent infringement. For products subject to injunctions, we have 
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found, this could be enough evidence to show an intent to induce domestic 
infringement. 332    
An indemnification agreement should not be enough to establish that 
control and benefit lie within the United States.  Absent evidence that the 
primary purpose of the indemnification agreement was to result in 
unauthorized use of the invention within the United States, it is reasonable 
to assume that the primary purpose of the indemnification agreement 
exists for some purpose other than to maintain control and reap domestic 
benefit.  However, an indemnification agreement may be indicative of an 
overall intent.  Insufficient in and of itself — it may be significant in light 
of other activities on the part of the unauthorized user.   
Nor should designing a product to comply with United States regulations 
be enough to establish either that Fairchild controls the use of its products 
within the United States or that Fairchild benefits from the use of those 
products.  However, again, this may be indicative of other actions on the 
part of Fairchild that may lead to a finding of control and benefit within 
the United States.  The relationship between the parties using Fairchild’s 
chips and Fairchild must be examined in light of all of these questions 
before a determination can be made.  If Fairchild conditions its profits, 
even downstream, on the sale within the United States of goods — then 
Fairchild is benefitting financially from the domestic use.  The 
indemnification clause may be further proof of a relationship between 
Fairchild and the end-user that results in Fairchild’s control over the 
unauthorized domestic use of the power supply controller chip.  
Compliance with regulations should be examined in the light of the 
relationship between the parties — not seeking to penalize international 
companies seeking to maximize the market for a product, but rather 
seeking to disincentive companies seeking to circumvent patent 
boundaries while profiting off of unauthorized domestic use. Evidence of 
active steps taken to control domestic use supports a finding that a party 
intends the domestic use and is seeking to circumnavigate the United 
States patent boundaries.  Such use must be found to be within the United 
States.   
Intent separates those who are genuinely seeking to circumnavigate the 
United States patent system and yet still practice domestically from those 
who are practicing part of the patented technology domestically with a 
                                                                                                                    
indemnification for patent infringement. For products subject to injunctions, we have 
been forced to limit this indemnification.”).    
332 Power Integrations, 843 F.3d at 1334 (“The jury also heard testimony that, while other 
countries initially adopted the United States energy efficiency standards, certain countries 
had established different, more stringent standards of their own.”).   
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focus on the overseas application of the method.  Intent distinguishes the 
patent boundaries.    
8. ECONOMIC REALITIES 
Even after analyzing all of the issues described above, whether an 
invention falls within the boundaries of the United States will turn on the 
economic realities of the invention and its use.  Delineating the economic 
realities is a tricky proposition and a strict categorization of an invention 
can lead to strained results and could lead to technology covered by no 
countries’ laws.   
It cannot make sense to allow computer servers to go the way of 
commercial ships — flagged and established in countries with minimal 
legal protections for the parties.  Companies may choose to register 
vessels in countries other than the country where the company is based, or 
even where the ship is docked.333 That registration allows the ship to fly a 
nation’s flag with which nation the ship has only a tenuous nexus.334  
International maritime law generally holds that the law of the country 
whose flag the ship flies governs a ship.335  These “flags of convenience” 
may shelter a vessel from the laws of the country where the vessel is 
located.336  Ships that sail under a nation’s flag “shall be subject to its 
                                                                                                                    
333  See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: 
Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 162 (1997) (“One of the 
premises of the principle of freedom of the high seas is that all states have the right to grant 
nationality to a vessel in accordance with national and international law….  [T]he flag 
state, the state granting nationality to a vessel, has exclusive jurisdiction over that vessel 
on the high seas to the extent permitted by international law.); see also Tom Hamburger & 
Kim Geiger, Foreign Flagging of Offshore Rigs Skirts U.S. Safety Rules, L.A. TIMES 
(June 14, 2010), http:// articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/14/nation/la-na-oil-inspection-
20100615 (Companies can register vessels “in unlikely places such as the Marshall Islands, 
Panama and Liberia  —  reducing the U.S. government’s role in inspecting and enforcing 
safety and other standards.”).   
334 See, e.g., Captain Carl Smith, USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation Into the 
Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling 
Unit Deepwater Horizon, With Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico 21-22 April 2010 (May 
26, 2010), http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/dw/exhib/May%2026%20PDF.pdf 
(Captain Smith says that a vessel he was on was “flagged out of U.K., and they were 
presented with a nineteen million dollar tax bill. So on December 30th of that year, they 
changed their flag to Singapore, and then they paid the six thousand dollar tax bill.”) 
335 US v Jho, 534 F. 3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008)(“The law of the flag doctrine provides that a 
merchant ship is part of the territory of the country whose flag she flies, and that actions 
aboard that ship are subject to the laws of the flag state.”).  
336 See Anderson, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. at 162; and Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 119, 126 (2005) (“Despite the fact that the cruises are operated by a company 
based in the United States, serve predominantly United States residents, and are in most 
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exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”337  The result of extending this 
notion to computer servers, used in so many method patents, may lead to a 
poor fit between the patent laws of a country and the server technology.  
The Marshall Islands, for instance, is a popular country in which to 
register ships and oil rigs.338 There is no patent law in the Marshall 
Islands.  In fact, “[t]he only intellectual property-related legislation relates 
to locally produced music recordings.”339   The Marshall Islands may, 
therefore, provide a patent shelter for servers.340  If the placement of a 
server in the Marshall Islands removes all liability for unauthorized use of 
methods that access the Marshall Island servers, then the patent system is 
broken.  The domestic user does not know and, in fact, has no ability to 
gain knowledge, of the server location, yet the domestic user is benefitting 
from the access the internet gives to the international servers.  Such a use 
weakens domestic patent protection.   
The law of the flag is a poor fit for the technological advances made 
possible by the internet and cloud computing.  The economic realities of 
the internet dictate the idea that a user should only be liable in one 
location.341  Otherwise, a user of a patented method sitting in Oklahoma 
could find themselves subject to being charged with unauthorized use of a 
patent in jurisdictions all over the world.  The economic realities of 
network technologies dictate that a party should be held accountable for 
unauthorized use of the technology in the location where the technology is 
controlled from, and the benefit is received.  If the practice of a single step 
of a method could lead to liability, then our unwitting domestic user could 
find themselves facing international prosecution.  On the other hand, to 
require every step be practiced domestically, then our strategic domestic 
user could circumvent United States patent boundaries by choosing to use 
an international server for the unauthorized practice of a domestically 
patented technology.  Neither of these scenarios leads to a desirable 
outcome for either our domestic user or the patentee.   
                                                                                                                    
other respects United States-centered ventures, almost all of [Norwegian Cruise Line’s] 
cruise ships are registered in other countries, flying so-called flags of convenience.”). 
337 UNCLOS art. 94. 
338 See Hamburger & Geiger, supra note 331.   
339 According to the United States Department of State, “[t]he only intellectual property-
related legislation relates to locally produced music recordings.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
2012 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT - MARSHALL ISLANDS (June 2012),  
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191946.htm.   
340 U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (issued April 28, 2009). 
341 Mark A. Lemley, David O’Brien, Ryan M. Kent, Ashok Ramani, Robert Van 
Nest, Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 270–71 (2005).   
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Medical diagnostic patents are a growing area of intangible innovation.  
Many medical diagnostic tests involve taking a sample of blood from a 
patient, analyzing the blood, thinking about the result, and changing the 
patient’s prescription based on the result.342   Neither doctor nor patient is 
concerned about where the blood is tested — only where the patient is.  A 
party wishes to avoid any potential patent infringement could circumvent 
the domestic patent system by sending the blood, or the electronic data 
representing the results of the blood draw, overseas, and then importing 
the relevant data.  It should make no difference whether the physical blood 
or the electronic picture of the blood is sent overseas.  Nor should it make 
a difference that the diagnostic step may occur outside the United States.  
The test is controlled from within the United States, the benefit is derived 
from within the United States, and the use should also be found to be 
within the United States.  Taking a pragmatic approach to the question of 
economic realities of the use of the patented invention can help the parties 
determine where the use has occurred.   
V. EXCLUDING THE INTANGIBLE 
Regulating and protecting American industry and trade has long been a 
critical factor in the United States economy.  Domestic industry is 
protected through a variety of methods, including seizures of harmful 
items at the border and the use of tariffs and subsidies.343  Section 337 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930 gives the United States International Trade 
Commission (“ITC”) the power to protect United States domestic industry 
from unfair methods of competition and unfair acts regarding the 
importation and sale of articles in the United States.344  However, section 
                                                                                                                    
342 See, e.g., Method of Treating IBD/Crohn’s disease and related conditions wherein 
drug metabolite levels in host blood cells determine subsequent dosage, U.S. Patent No. 
6,355,623 (issued March 12, 2002). 
343 CBP has the ability to seize the individual electronic devices of anyone seeking to 
enter the United States and search any information that CBP would like to search.  CBP 
can also keep the electronic device for an unspecified amount of time because of the 
potential harm of the intangible property accessed through the electronic device.  The 
harms of that intangible property on domestic industry can be quite extensive, yet, CBP 
is not reviewing personal data for its impact on domestic industry, and instead they are 
looking for signs of criminal behavior.   
344 19 U.S.C. § 1337.   
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337 sets forth no definition of article nor sets up a certain standard for 
what is a violation.345  Violations were left to the ITC to determine.346   
Central to the mission of the ITC is its mandate to protect domestic 
industry and promote trade through its power to exclude imports that 
violate domestic intellectual property rights or injure a domestic industry.  
Section 337 actions give the ITC the power to investigate complaints 
brought by owners of United States intellectual property who allege that 
they are subjected to unfair competition due to the importation of 
infringing products into the United States.347  The complainant is neither 
asserting its intellectual property against another company nor is the 
complainant initiating a lawsuit.  The ITC is entrusted with the task of 
determining whether an ITC complainant has established: (1) unfair 
competition or an unfair act; (2) importation, sale for importation, or sale 
after importation into the United States of the accused products; and (3) 
the existence of a domestic industry relating to the product in question.  
In investigations that not based upon the alleged infringement of 
enumerated federal statutory intellectual property rights, a complainant 
also must prove (4) that the alleged unfair act has caused or threatens to 
cause injury.348  The ITC’s mission is to protect domestic industry, not 
complainant’s intellectual property rights.349  To draw distinctions 
between the tangible elements and the intangible elements in an allegation 
of intellectual property infringement is to misunderstand the mission of 
the ITC.  
A. ARTICULATING A DEFINITION OF ARTICLE 
Congress has deemed it illegal to import articles that infringe patents and 
impact domestic industry.  The role of the ITC is to protect trade and 
domestic industry.  When domestic industry is harmed by patent 
infringement, and a complaint is filed at the ITC, then there should be no 
difference in the type of article being imported — tangible or intangible.   
                                                                                                                    
345 Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, Chief Commissioner speaking.  72 F.R.D. 239 (1976).    
346 Id.   
347 19 U.S.C. § 1337.   
348 Id.   
349 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, MISSION STATEMENT, 
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/mission_statement.htm.   
 
63] INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY, INDUSTRIAL AGE LAWS [2019 
On being asked to exclude intangible articles, the Commission has 
repeatedly found jurisdiction.350  The Supreme Court has held that such an 
interpretation should be accorded deference if it meets the two-part test set 
forth in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.351 Under 
this test, the first question asked is “whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.”352  If Congress has not spoken then “the 
issue for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”353   
Accordingly, the ITC’s definition must be viewed through the Chevron 
lens.  If congressional intent is clear, then the agency “must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 354   However, if the 
statute is silent or leaves a gap for the agency to fill, the court must 
determine whether the agency’s interpretation is proper.  When the Tariff 
Act of 1930 was enacted, the information age had not yet begun.  The term 
“article” is broad in scope and has never been restricted to items creatable 
and contemplatable at the time of the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1930.  
There is no reason now to restrict article to goods of a tangible nature.  
Statutory silence is not the same thing as a lack of coverage.355   
Congress has not directly answered whether intangible goods qualify as 
articles under section 337 giving the ITC discretion in reaching a 
definition, but such discretion must be exercised in a manner consistent 
with the Congressional policy underlying the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended in the Trade Act of 1974.356  The second question raised by 
Chevron is whether interpreting the term “article” to include both the 
intangible and the tangible is a permissible construction of the statute.  To 
effectuate Congressional intent, the term should be given its broadest 
possible meaning. 
When a statute uses a term throughout, that use carries a presumption that 
Congress “intended that the term have the same meaning in each of the 
                                                                                                                    
350 See Kumar, Sapna, Regulating Digital Trade, (“The ITC interpreted ‘article’ through 
formal adjudication, in accordance with §§ 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act.”); 19 U.S.C. § 337(c) (“Each determination under subsection (d) or (e) of this 
section shall be made on the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in 
conformity with the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5.”). 
351 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
352 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
353 Id. 
354 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778.   
355 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980).   
356 Sloan, 436 U.S. at 118, 98 S.Ct. 1702.   
 
2019] TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [64 	
pertinent sections or subsections of the statute.”357  Therefore, to define 
the term “article” the ITC should undertake a reasoned analysis as to how 
other agencies have interpreted the term as used in the Trade Act of 1974, 
and ensure that any definition implemented by the ITC is consistent with 
the definition implemented by other agencies.358  Under the Chevron test, 
the ITC has a great deal of freedom in determining what the definition of 
article is — and finding that an article includes the intangible is a 
“permissible construction of the statute.” 359    
In 1998, the ITC found that the legislative history of section 337 
supported the conclusion that intangible items are articles covered by 
337.360  The ITC stated that “in passing the 1988 amendments to section 
337, Congress stated that the predecessor version of section 337 ‘was 
designed to cover a broad range of unfair acts’ and that the purpose of the 
1988 amendments was “to strengthen the effectiveness of section 337 in 
addressing the growing problems being faced by U.S. companies from the 
importation of articles which infringe U.S. intellectual property rights.” 361 
The ITC focused on the ITC’s responsibility to “effectively remedy[] 
violations of section 337.” 362  Such a “remedy would be rendered 
significantly less effective if it did not extend to electronic transmissions 
of software.” 363   
Congress did not codify a definition of the term “article.”  Contextually 
looking at the term “article” in the Trade Act of 1974 the definition 
remains unclear.  The use of the term article may have been chosen for the 
very reason that it is unclear, allowing for an uncommon breadth in 
interpretation.  The term article should be interpreted consistently within 
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in the Trade Act of 1974.  Under the 
Tariff Act, the Department of Labor (Labor), the ITC and CBP are each 
authorized to regulate international trade.  In fulfilling its regulatory role, 
each agency has relied on a definition of the term.  Labor and CBP have 
                                                                                                                    
357 SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S., 263 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).   
358 Former Employees of Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 408 F.Supp.2d 
1338, 1345 (C.I.T. 2005) (“The same term cannot have different meanings in related 
statutes.”).   
359 Id. 
360 In the Matter of Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components 
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-383, USITC Pub. 1998-3154 (Jan. 1999)[hereinafter the 383 
Investigation].    
361 Id.   
362 Id.   
363 Id.   
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both interpreted article to cover the tangible and intangible — rendering 
such an interpretation a reasonable interpretation of section 337. 
1. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL 
Under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”), 
only tangible items are subject to tariff — so, the only software that is 
subject to tariff is software recorded to a form of media — no electronic 
transmissions.   The Supreme Court has held that tariff classification 
rulings by the U.S. Customs Service do not merit Chevron deference.364  If 
an item is included in HTSUS then it is an article under the Tariff Act365 
— however, the HTSUS is not the only basis upon which to determine 
whether an item is an article for purposes of the Tariff Act.366 
Customs has held that “the transmission of software modules and products 
to the United States from a foreign country via the Internet is an 
importation of merchandise into the customs territory of the United States 
in that the software modules and products are brought in to the United 
States from a foreign country.” 367  According to Customs, therefore, 
software is merchandise and a good, even if not covered by the HTSUS.  
Articles, such as merchandise and goods, are both tangible and intangible.  
Telecommunications, however, have been expressly exempted from tariff 
duties, potential evidence of Congressional intent to avoid regulating the 
entry of digital information through electronic transmission.368  Regulation 
of the entry of digital information is still monitored by CBP, who can 
seize the individual electronic devices of anyone seeking to enter the 
United States and search for information stored therein.  CBP can also 
keep the electronic device for an unspecified amount of time because of 
the potential harm of the intangible property accessed through the 
electronic device.  The harms of that intangible property on domestic 
industry can be quite extensive, yet, CBP is not reviewing personal data 
for its impact on domestic industry, and instead, they are looking for signs 
of criminal behavior.  CBP has a demonstrable interest in intangible data 
                                                                                                                    
364 Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 2012) 
365 Former Employees of Merrill Corp. v. US, 387 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1343-44 (July 28, 
2005).   
366 Id. at 1343.   
367 Customs Ruling HQ 114459 (Sept. 17, 1998) (available at 
http://www.faqs.org/rulings/rulings1998HQ114459.html).  
368 The HTSUS does not consider telecommunications transmissions as goods and are 
thus exempted from duty. See id. at 27-28 (citing HTSUS, General Note 3e (2004)) 
Former Employees of Gale Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 403 F.Supp.2d 1299 (C.I.T. 
2005).   
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entering the United States.   
2. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR369 
The definition of the term “article” as used in the Trade Act of 1974 has 
been extensively discussed outside the context of the ITC and in the 
context of the Department of Labor.  The Trade Act of 1974 has been 
amended over the years to allow Labor to provide trade adjustment 
assistance benefits to workers who have lost their jobs.370  In order to 
qualify for assistance under the Trade Adjustment Assistance program 
(TAA), there are several requirements, including the specific requirement 
that the workers must have lost their jobs because of the shift of 
production overseas of articles or as the result of increased imports of 
articles.371   
Neither the Trade Act nor the TAA contains a definition of the word 
“article.”  However, workers are only rendered eligible for TAA if the 
shift of production overseas of articles has an economic effect on the 
domestic workers.372  If the shift overseas is not a shift of articles, but 
rather a shift of services, then the displaced workers are not eligible for 
assistance.373  Reflective of the issue facing the ITC, the claims based on 
articles have changed significantly over the years, transitioning from 
traditional tangible items with a set commercial value to intangible items 
with an uncertain commercial value.  The judicial interpretation of the 
term article in the TAA context is instructive, if not determinative, in the 
ITC context.  Assistance is now offered under the TAA to workers if their 
jobs have been affected by the shift overseas of intangible articles, as well 
as tangible.  Intangible articles render workers eligible for assistance if 
                                                                                                                    
369  This Section examines the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers and Alternative 
Trade Adjustment Assistance programs (collectively referred to herein as TAA) 
administered by the U.S. Department of Labor, which was most recently extended and 
amended in October 2011. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271-2331 (amended by To Extend the 
Generalized System of Preferences, and For Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 112-40, 125 
Stat. 401 (2011) (containing Title II, Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 
2011)).  
370 “The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Program is a federal program that provides 
a path for employment growth and opportunity through aid to US workers who have lost 
their jobs as a result of foreign trade.”  http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/factsheet.cfm.   
371 19 USC § 2272 (e.g., “imports of articles like or directly competitive with articles”).   
372 19 USC § 2481; Fortin v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1979); 19 USC § 2272 
(“imports of articles or services like or directly competitive with articles produced or 
services supplied by such firm have increased”).   
373 See, e.g., Fortin v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1979)(“the term ‘article’ as 
used throughout the Trade Act, was not meant to include services.”).    
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such articles would render workers eligible if embodied in a physical 
medium.  Furthermore, the commercial value of articles is no longer a 
consideration in determining whether assistance is available.   
Until 2006, the Department of Labor routinely denied assistance to 
workers whose jobs were affected by the shift overseas of intangible 
articles.  In January of 2006, the CIT held that the “Trade Act does not 
define the term ‘articles’ within the statutory language, and specifically 
absent is a tangibility requirement.” 374  The CIT went on to find that a 
requirement  “that software code must be on a physical medium to be an 
article” incongruous with recent technology.375  According to the CIT, the 
plain language of the Trade Act does not require that an article must be 
tangible.   
Labor subsequently issued three administrative decisions that changed the 
Agency’s definition of the term “article.”   In a series of decisions 
reversing earlier denials of assistance376, Labor found that “there are 
tangible and intangible articles” and clarified that “[s]oftware and similar 
intangible goods that would have been considered articles for the purposes 
of the Trade Act if embodied in a physical medium will now be 
considered to be articles regardless of their method of transfer.” 377   
The articles included financial software, coded in India, sent back into the 
United States and packaged and sold here; software produced in Mexico; 
and computerized embroidery and logo designs.  Each of these 
represented intangible articles, and until the Court of International Trade 
(CIT) remanded the rejections to Labor, denial of assistance was 
automatic.  Labor, upon remand from the CIT, found that an intangible 
article “that would have been considered an article if embodied in a 
physical medium” was an article for purposes of the TAA.378  Labor also 
found that when Mexican workers were “being trained in the production 
                                                                                                                    
374 Former Employees of Computer Sciences Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 30 CIT 124, 
414 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1340 (C.I.T. 2006) (quoting Second Remand Negative 
Determination, 70 Fed.Reg. at 52,130). 
375 Id. 
376 The earlier “negative determination was based on the findings that the subject worker 
group provided business and information consulting, specialized application software, 
and technology outsourcing support to customers in the financial services industry, and 
that the workers did not produce an article within the meaning of Section 222 of the 
Trade Act of 1974.”  Computer Sciences Corporation, Financial Services Group, East 
Hartford Connecticut: Notice of Revised Determination on Remand, 71 Fed. Reg. 18, 
355-01, 18,355 (Labor Apr. 11, 2006).   
377 Id.   
378 Id.   
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of new software” and “the production of such software now occurs in 
Mexico” that the Mexican workers were “engaged in the production of an 
article” and therefore the displaced American workers were entitled to 
assistance for the shift of software production, intangible articles, 
overseas. 379  Finally, Labor looked at workers “engaged in computerizing 
embroidery and logo designs” and found they were producing articles, as 
well, despite the lack of a physical medium.380  Labor found that “the 
workers’ firm produced an intangible article (digitized embroidery 
designs) that would have been considered an article if embodied in a 
physical medium” and that since articles can be both intangible and 
tangible, the workers were eligible to receive assistance.381  After this 
decision, assistance under the TAA was extended to workers whose jobs 
were affected by the shift overseas of intangible articles, as long as such 
articles would have been considered articles if embodied in a physical 
medium.   
These Administrative law cases set forth the change in understanding by 
Labor to the definition of “article” in the Trade Act of 1974.  In 2006, the 
CIT recognized a change in the Agency’s policy and summarized the 
holdings of the three decisions discussed above, while not going so far as 
to adopt the holdings as CIT rulings, inherently sanctioned a definition of 
article that includes tangible and intangible items.382   
Reiterating  Labor’s policy shift and the applicable interpretation of the 
term “article” by Labor, the CIT found that article included both tangible 
and intangible goods “regardless of their method of transfer.” 383  The 
former employees of Merrill Corporation sought assistance under the 
TAA after their jobs producing financial documents were eliminated. 384  
The employees were initially denied assistance because they were 
“engaged in the production of an intangible — rather than tangible — 
article” and subsequently denied assistance because the items produced by 
                                                                                                                    
379 Electronic Data Systems Corporation I Solutions Center, Fairborn, Ohio: Notice of 
Revised Determination on Remand, 71 Fed. Reg. 18, 355-02, 18,356 (Labor Apr. 11, 
2006).   
380 Lands’ End, A Subsidiary of Sears Roebuck and Company, Business Outfitters CAD 
Operations, Dodgeville, Wisconsin: Notice of Determination on Remand, 71 Fed. Reg. 
18, 357-01, (Labor Apr. 11, 2006).   
381 Id.   
382 Former Employees of IBM Corp., Global Services Div. v. U.S. Secretary of Labor, 
462 F.Supp.2d 1239 (CIT 2006).   
383 Former Employees of Merrill Corp. v. U.S., 387 F.Supp. 2d at 1344 (2007).   
384 Id.   
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Merrill lacked commercial value.385  Chastising Labor, the CIT held that a 
“distinction between tangible and intangible articles appears nowhere in 
the Trade Act…[and t]he distinction between tangible and intangible 
articles is contrary to the purpose of the Trade Act.” 386  The CIT held that 
any distinction between “tangible and intangible articles is ‘arbitrary’ and 
‘manifestly contrary to the statute.’”387   The purpose of the Trade Act is 
“to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor 
against unfair or injurious import competition, and to assist industries, 
firm [sic], workers, and communities to adjust to changes in international 
trade flows.”388   
The Trade Act does not define article, nor does it limit the definition to 
tangible items only.  Labor’s regulations support the conclusion that 
software code, regardless of the mode of importation, including code 
imported via the Internet, is an article under the Trade Act.  Electronic 
transmissions of all kinds are articles, tangible or intangible.   
3. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION 
In enacting the Trade Act of 1974, Congress neglected to define the word 
“article” leaving interpretation of the term up to the agencies 
implementing the Trade Act of 1974.  The ITC has exercised domain over 
numerous articles, without providing a comprehensive definition of the 
term, which may have been chosen because it “is itself a nebulous concept 
seemingly employed … for the very reason that it possesses an indefinite 
and neutral meaning.”389   
The frequent use of the undefined word article throughout the Trade Act 
“suggests … an intention that it assume the meaning and coloration 
appropriate to its specific context and best suited to effectuate the 
Congressional plan.”390  The Commission was first tasked with formally 
adjudicating its jurisdiction over software in the 383 investigation.391  At 
that time, the ITC treated software as an article of importation regardless 
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388 19 U.S.C. § 2012(4).   
389 Close & Stewart v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 466, 468 (Cust. Ct. 1967). 
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391 The 383 Investigation.   
 
2019] TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [70 	
of its mode of importation but determined not to exclude the software.392  
Instead, the Commission issued a cease and desist order that prohibited 
“the importation (including via electronic transmission), sale, offer for 
sale, lease, loan, other transfer, duplication, or distribution (including 
electronic distribution) of imported software and other components that 
contributorily infringe the patents in issue.” 393   
Focusing on the fact that section 337 exists to protect domestic companies 
from the importation of articles that infringe domestic intellectual property 
rights, the Commission found that electronically or physically, both 
infringe.  “Congress has delegated broad authority to the ITC to determine 
what constitutes an ‘article’ for purposes of Title 19 of the United States 
Code.”394  CBP may have difficulty regulating electronic transmissions 
into the United States,395 but the question of what CBP can do is a 
different question from what the ITC can do to protect domestic industry.  
Electronic transmission of respondents’ software is not substantively 
different from storing the software on a medium and shipping the medium 
into the United States.  The ease of circumventing an exclusion order by 
electronic transmissions, or the difficulty of CBP’s enforcement of that 
exclusion order of that software do not affect the scope of the 
Commission’s jurisdiction or cause the Commission to limit the reach of 
its remedial orders.  It makes little sense to find harm to domestic industry 
by the importation of a CD-ROM or disk containing respondents’ 
software, a component of an emulation system, but not by the use of that 
very same component imported in machine-readable form by electronic 
transmission.   
The legislative history of section 337 reflects debate by members of both 
houses using the term “articles” synonymously with “goods,” 
“merchandise,” and “commodities.”  As noted above, CBP has found that 
                                                                                                                    
392 Former Employees of Computer Sciences Corp. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 414 
F.Supp.2d 1334 (C.I.T. 2006); The 383 Investigation (Commission Opinion on Remedy, 
the Public Interest, and Bonding at 28–29, USITC Pub. 1998-3089 (Mar. 30, 1998)).     
393 The 383 Investigation.   
394 Former Employees of Computer Sciences Corp. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 414 
F.Supp.2d 1334 (C.I.T. 2006).   
395 It may be difficult, but it is not impossible.  In China, for instance, the government has 
implemented what is known colloquially as the Great Firewall of China.  The Great 
Firewall restricts access to electronic transmissions inside China.  
http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/30/technology/china-internet-firewall-google/ (“Beijing 
often describes what is known colloquially as the ‘Great Firewall’ as a critical national 
security tool.  ‘I can choose who will be a guest in my home,’ China's top Internet 
regulator Lu Wei said earlier this year.”) 
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intangible articles are goods and merchandise.  Furthermore, section 337 
has been amended a dozen times, and no amendment has suggested any 
Congressional intent to limit the definition “articles” to include only 
tangible articles. Limiting articles of commerce to tangible items 
arbitrarily excludes a broad range of infringing products and restricts the 
ability of the ITC to perform its intended function.   
The language of section 337 refers to “sale for importation”; 
“importation” and “sale after importation” all of which can cover 
electronic data transmissions of commercial value. Statutory construction 
supports the concept that articles are “imported items that are bought and 
sold in commerce,” whether those articles are tangible or intangible. 
Despite this, the Federal Circuit has held that the jurisdiction of the ITC 
does not extend to the transmissions of digital data.396  So holding, locks 
“the International Trade Commission into technological antiquity.”397  The 
mission of the ITC is to “investigate and make determinations involving 
imports claimed to injure a domestic industry or violate U.S. intellectual 
property rights” and there is no dispute that the intangible is covered by 
the patent statute and can, itself, be infringed.  Furthermore, such 
infringement can injure a domestic industry.  In order to exclude the 
intangible and protect domestic industry, any reasonable definition of 
article under section 337 must include both the tangible and intangible.   
B. REMEDIES 
The ITC is not an agency established to protect intellectual property rights 
holders, but rather to protect the domestic industry using intellectual 
property rights and both its scope of interest and the scope of available 
remedies is limited by such.398  Central to the mission of the ITC is its 
ability to protect domestic industry and promote trade by regulating 
“imports claimed to injure a domestic industry or violate U.S. intellectual 
property rights.”399 If unlawful activities are found, then the ITC may 
issue a general exclusion order (GEO) directed to all articles that violate 
                                                                                                                    
396 ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1290 (“Here we conclude that the literal text by itself, when 
viewed in context and with an eye towards the statutory scheme, is clear and thus 
answers the question at hand. ‘Articles’ is defined as ‘material things,’ and thus does not 
extend to electronic transmission of digital data.”).   
397 ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1310 (Newman, J. dissenting).   
398 The jurisdiction of the ITC arises in rem, which allows remedies when in personam 
jurisdiction may not exist.  See, generally, Sapna Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 
Fla. L. Rev. 1909 (2015); Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2015).   
399 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, MISSION STATEMENT, 
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/mission_statement.htm.   
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the U.S. intellectual property rights and injure a domestic industry; the 
ITC can issue a limited exclusion order (LEO) directed to only the specific 
articles that are named in the complaint and violate the U.S. intellectual 
property rights; and/or the ITC can issue a cease and desist order directed 
to the persons engaging in the violations of the U.S. intellectual property 
rights.400  Each of these allows the ITC to protect domestic industry in a 
different and compelling fashion.401  The Trade Act of 1974 specifically 
gave the ITC the power to issue cease and desist orders because “the 
existing statute, which provides no remedy other than exclusion of articles 
from entry, is so extreme or inappropriate in some cases that it is often 
likely to result in the Commission not finding a violation of this section, 
thus reducing the effectiveness of section 337 for the purposes 
intended.”402  Cease and desist orders expanded the ITC’s power, giving 
the Commission the ability to regulate infringing methods for the first 
time, an essential part of the imposition of import restrictions.   
The ITC addressed the question of tangible versus intangible articles head-
on in the 510 investigation.403  In the 510 investigation, Trend Micro 
complained that Fortinet, Inc. (“Fortinet”) was committing unfair acts and 
harming domestic industry by its “importation into the United States, the 
sale for importation into the United States, or the sale within the United 
States after importation of certain systems for detecting and removing 
computer viruses or worms, components thereof, and products containing 
same.” 404  The ITC determined that Fortinet was in violation of section 
337 and  fashioned a two-part remedy for this violation.405  First, the ITC 
issued an exclusion order barring the “importation of infringing antiviral 
software in a tangible medium.” 406  Second, acknowledging CBP’s 
determination not to regulate electronic technology — and Fortinet’s 
technology which transmits updates to the software electronically — the 
ITC issued a cease and desist order barring “the electronic transmission of 
the infringing antivirus software module by Fortinet.” 407  Absent the two-
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401 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, USITC Pub. 1978-
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part remedy, the detrimental impact on domestic industry would continue 
hampering the ITC’s ability to protect trade, as Fortinet would remain free 
to transmit electronically and unfairly the infringing software. 
Congress does not need to give the ITC additional statutory authority to 
regulate intangible articles.  In choosing the broad word “articles” and not 
using “articles of manufacture” or other limiting language, Congress gave 
a broad swath of rights to the ITC, and that original statutory authority 
should be respected.   
VI. CLAIMING THE INTANGIBLE 
Careful claim drafting can help innovators avoid many of the issues faced 
by those seeking to protect information age technology.  Drafting claims 
tying the intangible to the tangible helps information age technology fit 
under the protection of industrial age laws.  An example of claim drafting 
that addresses many of these problems can be found in the 2019 patent 
issued to Bose for a streaming audio player using a cloud-based service to 
transmit and respond to spoken user queries.408 The claim was carefully 
drafted to keep all elements of the patented method within the United 
States. 409  The method claimed receiving data from the cloud — but does 
not require any steps that occur only in the cloud. 410  As a result, all steps 
can occur within the United States, avoiding many of the issues addressed 
by this article. 
In 1975, James Diehr and Thomas Lutton sought to patent a process for 
curing rubber.411  Humans could use a mold press to cure rubber, but the 
use of a digital computer rendered the cure more efficient and more 
accurate.412  The Supreme Court found that this method claimed patent-
eligible subject matter as it claimed “a process for molding rubber 
                                                                                                                    
408 Claim 21 reads: “The streaming audio player of claim 20, wherein the first digital 
audio data comprises a response to the spoken user query that is received from a cloud-
based service.”  U.S. Patent No. 10,200,004 (issued Feb. 5, 2019).   
409 Id.   
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411 https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/content/diamond-v-diehr-brief-petitioner 
412 Id. (“Rubber products produced in a mold press are cured in the press for a specified 
time…. The time needed to obtain a good cure depends in part on the temperature inside 
the press, which is regulated by a thermostat….  It is possible, using well-known time, 
temperature, and cure relationships, to calculate when to open the press and remove the 
cured product….  The disadvantages of this practice are that erring on the side of caution 
will usually lead to overcuring the rubber, while keeping the mold open for more than a 
‘reasonable’ time will often result in undercuring….  [The] claimed invention employs a 
digital computer to overcome these drawbacks.”) 
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products.”413  The process was software, but since the result was a tangible 
one, the Supreme Court found the process patentable.414 
Almost 50 years later, Blue Spike patented a method of monitoring and 
analyzing signals.415  These patents claim the use of software to compare 
works of art, such as songs, video, or images and differentiate between the 
various works.416  Humans can compare works of art, but the software 
renders such a comparison faster and more accurate.417  In the course of 
one of many of Blue Spike’s patent infringement suits, the Northern 
District of California found that the patents were drawn to abstract ideas, 
and, furthermore, that the innovation consisted of merely using “routine 
computer components and methods … to accomplish this task with, in 
certain circumstances, greater efficiency than a human mind could 
achieve.”418  The court did go on to say that if the patent disclaimed what 
a human could do, and only claimed the benefits of the computer-
implemented comparison, then perhaps the claim would be patent eligible 
— but that would lead to an exceptionally narrow claim indeed.  
There has been a tremendous sea change in the fifty years between Diehr’s 
invention and Blue Spike’s invention.  As Justice Stevens noted in his 
dissent to Diehr, patenting software would have been nigh near impossible 
before 1968.419  A method of curing rubber, on the other hand, was 
patentable, as the Supreme Court noted in 1881 when it stated that there 
was no doubt that a process could be patentable, giving as one example 
Goodyear’s patent for a process of vulcanizing rubber.420  The patenting of 
software to perform a process that was, itself, clearly patentable, 
represented a shift in the judicial views of patentable subject matter — but 
a shift made palatable by the tangible and timeless subject matter of the 
software.  Even though the machines in Diehr were routine, and the art of 
curing rubber was well-known, the incorporation of software and the 
advantages and efficiencies brought by the software resulted in patent-
                                                                                                                    
413 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191.   
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eligible subject matter.  Blue Spike, on the other hand, was seeking to 
patent a method of using intangible software to accomplish an intangible 
result — that of comparing signals.  Although both Blue Spike and Diehr 
patented software that performed human tasks, only Blue Spike’s 
technology is abstract, as Diehr’s process uses software to generate a 
tangible product.421  The tangible nature of the outcome of the process is 
the dividing line between the patentability of Diehr’s software and the 
patentability of Blue Spike’s software.     
However, not all innovations can be so claimed,422 and for those 
innovations, care needs to be taken that the rights of those who seek to 
patent the intangible are not abrogated by a rigid categorical approach to 
patent protection.  Patent attorneys routinely draft claims to systems and 
methods in the same application to the same invention.423  It cannot make 
sense to place a higher value on system claims to devices that can be used 
domestically and internationally than on method claims.  Nor should claim 
drafting be entirely ignored by the courts.  Finding a device used 
domestically is not a way to fix a claim drafting error.  Instead, such a 
determination recognizes the fact that the end-user benefits domestically 
from a method that crosses geographic boundaries, and therefore, an 
unauthorized use harms the patent system — even if every step does not 
occur domestically.   
The spirit and intention of patent protection extend as thoroughly to 
method claims as they do to system claims.  Unauthorized use occurs 
within the United States, regardless of the type of invention, if the use is 
controlled within the geographic boundaries and domestic benefit accrues 
from that use.  Domestic industry is harmed by those who unfairly import 
electronic transmissions, just as must as it is harmed by those who unfairly 
import media on which data is recorded.  Limiting the scope of the ITC to 
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tangible data will result in claims being drafted to reflect this unfair 
restriction on the mission of the ITC.  That should not have to be the case.     
PurePredictive, Inc. is a small company that specializes in machine 
learning innovations and automating advanced analytics through the use 
of artificial intelligence (AI).424  Open-source software company H2O 
runs a machine learning platform.425  PurePredictive sued H2O for patent 
infringement.  Under Alice, the court found that the software was an 
abstract idea, as PurePredictive was unable to show that “its claims 
improve the functioning of a computer-related technology rather than use 
computers as a tool.”426  Using machine learning to improve analytics 
remains an intangible, abstract idea, leaving PurePredictive to satisfy the 
second factor of the Alice test.  PurePredictive’s innovation uses software 
to render more efficient and accurate well-known analytic models and is 
“simply an implementation of the basic concept of predictive analytics.”427 
AI systems seem sure to become further embedded in many industries as 
well as into daily life around the world. How to best protect these 
inventions is a complicated issue and an increasingly important area. As 
argued by Professor Ramsay in Artificial Stupidity, AI is one field where 
there may not be a current solution to promote innovation while also 
promoting disclosure.428  AI is commonly used to accomplish well-known 
tasks in new computer-aided manners, as the PurePredictive example 
shows.  When the innovation is the use of an intangible assist, enforcing a 
patent on a new method of accomplishing a non-novel concept has proven 
a complicated task under the modern interpretation of the patent laws.  
The number of issued patents in the field of Machine Learning shot up 
34% between 2013 and 2017, rendering AI one of the fastest growing 
areas of patent grants.429  Enforcing that patent in federal courts by 
meeting the two-part Alice test, however, remains nothing more than an 
abstract idea for many artificial intelligence developers.430  Alice states 
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that patentability must be judged after an innovation claiming an abstract 
idea.431  Such innovation may be patent-eligible, if that innovation claims 
an “inventive concept” that transforms the abstract idea into one that is 
patent eligible.  As PurePredictive learned, when the inventive concept is 
using AI to accomplish a human task with greater efficiency and speed, 
proving that the inventive concept is not well known in the art is 
immensely difficult.   
In drafting a patent, a good prosecutor will always take into consideration 
not only who owns the patent, but whom will be using the patent, and who 
the patentee may wish to prevent from using the patent.  AI, as a field, 
has, at least as one goal, to render a device autonomous.432  Machine 
autonomy can make detection of infringement very difficult, and render 
nigh near impossible a determination of who the infringer is.433  Patents 
must be drafted taking into consideration both the possibility of 
infringement being difficult to detect -- and who will be considered the 
infringer.  Furthermore, a patent prosecutor may seek to narrow the patent, 
and, thus, limit the protection for the artificial intelligence innovation by 
tying the invention to the tangible and avoiding falling down Alice’s rabbit 
hole.434  A narrower patent is a less valuable patent.435  This limited 
protection, combined with the increasing cost of patent litigation, and 
concerns over the enforceability of these patents in the judicial system, 
may disincentive artificial intelligence innovators from even applying for 
patents on their innovations in the first place.   
Careful claim drafting can ameliorate many of the issues articulated in this 
article.  Finding an invention used domestically cannot rescue a patent 
prosecutor who has made an error in claim drafting.  The invention 
remains that claimed by the patentee and nothing more.  The intention is 
to determine what that invention is, where the invention is controlled 
from, and who benefits from the invention.   
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VII. TRADE SECRETS AND PRIVATE ORDERING 
Innovation in the information age evolves rapidly — and, as this article 
points out, is often poorly protected by the industrial age laws.  Given the 
tremendous difficulties in protecting the intangible in the patent system, it 
can be foreseen that many innovators will turn to trade secrets and private 
ordering for protection instead.  Trade secrets and private ordering creates 
tremendous barriers to entry in these fields and is not in the public’s best 
interest.  At the moment, for instance, autonomous vehicles are a rapidly 
developing field of innovation.  Many developers in this field are relying on 
trade secret laws and private ordering to protect their valuable 
technology.436  Private ordering can be a significant stumbling block for 
competitors seeking to enter new markets and defeats the value of our 
patent system.  Without the public disclosure required by the patent laws, 
competitors do not have the information to design around other autonomous 
cars, and are, perhaps, more reluctant to enter a field where the start-up 
costs are high.  Fewer competitors means fewer choices for consumers, and 
fewer choices may mean higher costs.437  There are other potential issues as 
well — including “the temptation of competitors to shortcut the multi-
million-mile learning process by hiring away valued employees and 
encouraging theft of the learned data.” 438  Furthermore, trade secret 
protection requires a tremendous amount of security and a small pipeline of 
talent — which can also increase the costs.  
Trade secret protection and private ordering carry significant limitations.  
Cummins, one of the largest American manufacturers of diesel engines, is 
an innovator in many fields, including natural gas-fueled engines.  
Cummins sells engines all over the world and has joint ventures to sell, 
manufacture, and maintain engines in numerous countries, including 
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Russia,439 China,440 and the Middle East.441  Trade secret protection and 
contracts are not adequate for Cummins.  Cummins needs to have its 
partners be able to manufacture and maintain its engines and to do so must 
share internal information about those engines.  A contract only provides so 
much protection.  Breach of a non-disclosure agreement can result in 
charges against the breacher — but once the information is disseminated, 
the non-disclosure agreement has lost its effectiveness.  Protection against 
trade secret theft is a real issue — particularly if combined with 
international facilities.  Between 2008 and 2012, at least “58 defendants 
[were] charged in Federal Court related to Chinese espionage” including 
espionage charges for selling “biotech trade secrets from Dow Chemical 
and Cargill Inc. to China” 442 and theft of source code for American 
Semiconductor’s wind turbine.443  American Semiconductor was so 
concerned about theft of its intellectual property that it “went to great 
lengths to lock down its software and allow access only by its own 
employees.” 444  American Semiconductor learned of the theft after its 
partner began using an unreleased version of the operation software.445  
The strength of the patent system is the protection it provides to those who 
disclose the relevant information to the public.  For many of these 
international companies, and even domestic companies participating in 
numerous joint ventures, that protection is worth the disclosure.  The 
problem, as this article points out, may be getting that protection in the 
first place.   
There is a strong public policy in promoting the protection of science and 
the useful arts through the patent system.  The patent system grants 
patentees the right to exclusive use of their innovation for a limited time in 
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return for describing their innovations and enabling others to practice the 
art.  However, as the limitations on the rewards given to information age 
innovations shrink, the incentives for disclosure diminish as well.  
Innovations are increasingly being protected by trade secrets and private 
ordering — narrowing the dedication to the public of the description of the 
invention.   
Using trade secret as a form of protection and relying on private ordering 
presents a different set of problems for the owners of the intellectual 
property.  However, such use also expands the protection of intellectual 
property far beyond the scope envisioned by the patent system.  The 
balance between promotion of science and the useful arts, the reward 
granted innovators and our industrial age laws is currently undermining 
the public policy central to our patent system.  In the information age, 
innovators deserve protection based on the patent-eligibility of the 
invention, not the tangible nature of the invention.   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
There is a problem, and it needs to be fixed.  In 2020, it is estimated that 
there will be over 75 billion devices connected to the Internet of Things.446  
Each of these devices will be trafficking in the intangible — through their 
transmissions of data as well as the methods of using the devices.  Without 
the clarifications detailed in this article, domestic innovators will find 
themselves in the Wild West — looking to private ordering to protect their 
innovation, innovating overseas, or seeking ways to ensure that if their 
innovations cannot be protected, then their innovations cannot be copied.  
There is a substantial public interest in building the public storehouse of 
knowledge.  It is time to recognize that the United States Patent Code and 
the Trade Act of 1974 do not discriminate between protection of the 
intangible and the tangible.     
If the internet is to be free of borders as many have argued, then the public 
interests in promoting innovation and protecting domestic industry must 
be re-evaluated.447  With the erosion of geographic boundaries, the 
increase in intangible innovation, and the seamless integration of 
technology that exists outside the misunderstood boundaries of domestic 
patent and trade policies, technology will soon bloom with no guidelines, 
                                                                                                                    
446 Statista Research Department, Internet of Things (IoT) Connected Devices Installed 
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447 Editorial, Keep the Internet Free of Borders, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), 
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no public regulation and promote the interest of those developing the 
technology, not those consuming it.  A company seeking to protect the 
intangible and promote the public interest in disclosure faces many 
obstacles.  At the PTO, the company seeking to patent the intangible must 
prove that their innovation is not abstract.  A suit for patent infringement 
on a method is held to a different standard than a suit for patent 
infringement on a system.  At the ITC, the e-reader holding the data can 
be excluded, but not the data the e-reader downloads.  The internet should 
be free of borders — but geographic boundaries should not undercut the 
value of the intangible to patentees.   
Statutory language requires no differentiation between method claims, 
machine claims, and system claims.  If the subject matter is patent 
eligible, then it should be subject to the same protection regardless of the 
type of claim or the category of the patent.  Clarification can best occur by 
amending section 100 to define invention and utility clearly.  Our patent 
boundaries need to be reset and evaluated in light of where the invention 
will be perceived as being practiced by the users; does the unauthorized 
user know of the patent at the time of the unauthorized use; what are the 
terms of the arrangement leading to the question of whether the invention 
is being practiced within the United States; what are the nature of the 
intellectual property and the character of the commercial embodiment; 
how is the pricing of the agreement structured, what aspects are occurring 
where, and to whom does the financial benefit of the invention accrue; 
what is the commercial relationship between the site where potential 
infringement could occur and the site where control of the invention is 
retained; what is the established profitability of the invention; how 
commercially successful is it and what is its current popularity; and what 
are the economic realities of the potential infringement.  The ease with 
which intangible information crosses geographic boundaries and the very 
nature of the domestic industry in intangible technology demonstrates how 
vital the ITC’s role is in information-age technology.  The ITC is unable 
to fulfill its mission of protecting domestic industry without having the 
ability to exclude all articles, tangible or intangible, that are harming 
domestic industry and are the subject of unfair acts.  
At a recent Senate hearing, it was said that “If it ain’t tangible, it ain’t 
patent eligible.”448  This needs to be fixed.  Much of modern innovation 
focuses on data — an intangible asset fraught with value and judgment.  
The Industrial Age laws can protect both public interest and promote 
innovation in the Information Age.  
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